IT'S NOT AS BAD AS OTHERS THINK: HOW THE DIFFERENTIAL PERSPECTIVES OF TARGETS AND OBSERVERS AFFECT THE PERCEIVED NEGATIVITY OF THE SITUATION AND SUBSEQUENT COOPERATIVE RESPONSES

by

McKenzie Rae Rees

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of
The University of Utah
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Business Administration

David Eccles School of Business

The University of Utah

May 2015

The University of Utah Graduate School

STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION APPROVAL

The dissertation of **McKenzie Rae Rees**

has been approved by the following supervisory committee members:

Harris Sondak	, Co-Chair	**3/4/2015** Date Approved
Kristina A. Diekmann	, Co-Chair	**3/4/2015** Date Approved
Jennifer R. Overbeck	, Member	**2/23/2015** Date Approved
Elizabeth R. Tenney	, Member	**2/23/2015** Date Approved
Adam D. Galinsky	, Member	**2/28/2015** Date Approved

and by **William S. Hesterly**, Associate Dean of

the **David Eccles School of Business**

and by David B. Kieda, Dean of The Graduate School.

ABSTRACT

Previous research has demonstrated that targets who are directly affected by the outcomes of a situation focus on more detail in a situation than observers who see or overhear a situation but are not directly affected by the outcomes. However, behavioral responses of targets and observers suggest that their perceptions vary in other important ways. This research proposes and finds that individuals' perceptions of the valence, that is the positivity or negativity, of a situation is affected by their role as a target or an observer. Specifically, observers have more negative perceptions than targets do. Such perceptions affect targets' and observers' cooperative behavior with initiators of a situation. To achieve cooperative behavior among observers, positive perceptions can be fostered through observers taking the perspective of the target, as targets often have more positive perceptions of the situation than do observers. Across five studies using different contexts, including bargaining games, organizational interactions, and feedback in a ballet course, some evidence is found to support the propositions. A discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the empirical findings, as well as suggestions for future work, concludes the research.

For Garrett, who was with me every step.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendices

LIST OF FIGURES

Figures

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and advice of Kristina Diekmann and Harris Sondak, particularly in the early stages of the project.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Shortly after his appointment, Microsoft CEO, Satya Nadella, spoke at a conference centered on women in technology. Although his comments about women in the technology industry were generally positive and supportive, one negative comment, suggesting that women should not ask for raises, quickly led to harsh criticism of Nadella. Much of this criticism, however, did not come from the conference's target audience—professional women in technology—but rather from others outside the target audience (e.g., Dishman, 2014; Wingfield, 2014), who even suggested that Microsoft be boycotted by women in technology (Chowdhry, 2014). Yet, although Nadella's comments were targeted directly at them, members of the target audience perceived such comments as attempts to pass along words of wisdom rather than to attack professional women, consistent with the theme of Nadella's overall speech (Burrows, 2014; Chowdhry, 2014; Dishman, 2014). The attendees found Nadella's comments to be valuable, and many of them hoped he would return to the conference in 2015, as he had committed to do before the conference began (Burrows, 2014).

Had Nadella's comments been only good or only bad, it is likely that both the target audience and outsiders would have had similar perceptions of the speech (Weiner, 1985). But as the example of Microsoft's CEO illustrates, situations are often *ambivalent*, or include both good aspects (e.g., Nadella's supportive comments of women) and bad

aspects (e.g., Nadella's comments discouraging women in the professional setting). Although in ambivalent situations individuals' responses may be more likely to systematically vary, in all situations—good, bad, or ambivalent—situational factors may affect how a person perceives the situation, which leads to the question: what situational factors affect an individual's perceptions of the valence of a situation? This question is important to address, as it helps explain why individuals' perceptions of a situation systematically vary, and why individuals' perceptions may be inconsistent across similar situations. Additionally, addressing this question demonstrates that situational roles affect perceptions of the valence of a situation, which affect individuals' subsequent responses.

In the current research, I argue that the temporary, informal role that a person holds in a situation as a *target*—an individual who participates in a situation and is directly affected by the actions initiated in the situation—or an *observer*—an individual who sees or overhears a situation but is not directly affected by the actions initiated in the situation—has a systematic effect on his or her perception of the situation, particularly in ambivalent situations. Specifically, I argue that observers perceive situations as more negative than targets do, as was the case in the perceptions that conference attendees (targets) and outside constituents (observers) had of the Microsoft CEO's comments. I base my arguments on motivational theories, suggesting that because targets and observers have different motivations in a situation (Rozin & Royzmann, 2001), they develop different perceptions that vary in terms of valence.

I further argue that individuals' positive or negative perceptions affect their subsequent behaviors. Following the Microsoft speech, for example, many women at the conference offered support for Nadella and his vision for Microsoft (Chowdhry, 2014). In

contrast, many who were not the target of Nadella's comments voiced their skepticism of the direction Nadella was taking Microsoft (Associated Press, 2014). Supporting my argument, I draw upon previous research that has examined how targets and observers respond differently to purely good situations, or situations that only include good events, and purely bad situations, or situations that only include bad events (e.g., Ames & Kammrath, 2015; Boles, Croson, & Murninghan, 2000; Brockner, Tyler, & Cooper-Schneider, 1992; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010; Spencer & Rupp, 2009), reasoning that the patterns of behavior in such situations are amplified in ambivalent situations. Such research suggests that observers' responses are more negative than targets' responses. I focus on cooperation of targets and observers with the initiators of situations, as cooperative responses have implications for interpersonal relationships (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010) and organizational outcomes (Beersma et al., 2003; Ellis et al., 2003; Varella, Javidan, & Waldman, 2012).

As evidenced in the Microsoft example, negative perceptions of a situation, and subsequent negative responses toward a situation's initiator (in this case the CEO of Microsoft) can harm interpersonal relationships in and among groups (e.g., Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Cohen-Charash, 2009), which can be harmful to individual satisfaction and reduce group performance and cohesion (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Kwan, Bond, & Singelis, 1997). Because of such consequences, an important question becomes how to attenuate the negative responses of observers. I argue that by attenuating observers' negative perceptions, their negative responses will also be attenuated. To do so, I argue that by engaging in *perspective taking* (i.e., an individual's understanding of another individual's viewpoint; Davis, 1983; Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, &

Gollwitzer, 2011) of the target, an observer might better understand and adopt the perceptions of a target (Baston, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005) and be more likely to have positive perceptions of a situation than if they do not engage in perspective taking.

This dissertation proceeds as follows: I begin by reviewing research that examines how bad and good events affect targets' and observers' perceptions. Furthermore, I outline the motivations that appear to shape such perceptions. I argue that observers perceive situations more negatively than targets do, even when only good events occur. In contrast, targets are more likely than observers to perceive that a situation is positive. I then discuss targets' and observers' responses to situations, arguing that observers' responses tend to be more negative than targets' responses because of their varying perceptions. Finally, I argue that perspective taking is one way in which observers can be encouraged to have positive perceptions, which may encourage observers to have positive responses to a situation. These arguments are tested in five studies, followed by a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the findings, limitations of the studies, and avenues for future research.

The Varying Perceptions of Targets and Observers

Social psychology argues that a target's experience in a situation is much different than an observer's experience (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). A target experiences a situation first hand, while an observer only watches or hears about it, which results in each party having different perceptions of the situation (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). For example, targets tend to recognize more detail in a situation than

observers do (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Vazire, 2010).

In addition to the amount of detail an individual recognizes in a situation, there may be other ways in which targets' and observers' perceptions vary, including the *valence* of their perceptions, or the extent to which the situation is perceived as positive, negative, or *ambivalent* (a combination of both positive and negative). Situations can be good, bad, or ambivalent. Yet, how a person perceives a situation ultimately defines the valence of the situation for that particular person. This means that a person's perceptions of the situation's valence may be different from the actual valence of the situation. In purely good or bad situations individuals can easily recognize the situation's valence (Weiner, 1985), which may result in targets and observers having more similar perceptions than in ambivalent situations in which the valence of the situation is not clear. Thus, compared with purely good or purely bad situations, in ambivalent situations individuals' perceptions of the valence may be more strongly affected by other factors such as a person's role.

Individuals can conceptualize good and bad as independent factors or endpoints on a single continuum, resulting in individuals recognizing a situation as purely good, purely bad, both good and bad (i.e., ambivalent), or neither good nor bad (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Taylor, 1991). While there is general agreement that individuals focus more on bad than good events (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), there is disagreement regarding when individuals also attend to good events (see Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzmann, 2001). Greater attention to good events seems to rest on the individual's salient motivations in the situation (Rozin & Royzmann, 2001). Indeed, individuals' salient motivations in the moment help them determine what

information is important in the situation (Kunda, 1990). Situational factors can systematically affect the salience of different motivations (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). When involved the same situation, however, one factor that may differentially affect the salience of individuals' motivations is their roles as targets or observers.

Targets' and observers' motivations systematically vary in salience (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). Two motivations that commonly affect individuals and that appear to vary across targets and observers are the motivations to preserve a positive self-concept and to be included in socially desirable groups. Such motivations seem to be more salient to targets than to observers because targets' experiences in the situation directly help or hinder the fulfillment of their motivations. Next, I outline each motivation and explain how its salience to targets and observers may uniquely affect their perceptions of the valence of a situation.

Motivations Related to the Self-Concept

Individuals are motivated to maintain a positive self-concept (Taylor, 1983; Taylor & Brown, 1988). When one's self-concept becomes threatened, the motivation to maintain a positive self-concept becomes highly salient, resulting in individuals attempting to find ways in which to reinforce their positive self-concept (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993). Such a threat may occur when individuals have little to no control over a situation, as they cannot ensure that the outcomes of the situation will have a positive, or at least not a negative, effect on their self-concept. To the extent that both targets and observers do not have control in a situation, because targets in the situation are directly affected by the situation's outcomes, this lack of control will be more

threatening to their self-concept than to those who are observers of the situation because observers are not directly affected by the situation's outcomes.

One way targets protect their self-concept is by adopting positive perceptions of the situation (Gilbert, 1998), which allow them to maintain a positive self-concept despite what occurs in a situation (Gilbert, 1998; Greenwald, 1980, 1981; Rutte & Messick, 1995; Schroth & Shah, 2000; Taylor, 1991; Taylor & Brown, 1988; van den Bos, Bruins, Wilke, & Dronkert, 1999). For example, one way individuals maintain a positive self-concept following economic transactions is by seeking out the favorable aspects of their own outcomes, including any actual or relative gains (Adams, 1965; Gardner, van Dyne, & Pierce, 2004; Miller, 1999; Twenge & Campbell, 2002). Targets also make favorable comparisons (Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985), ignore bad events (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Moreland & Sweeny, 1984), and attribute positive outcomes to their own abilities rather than situational factors (Baumeister, 1998; Jones & Nisbett, 1972) to help them to maintain a positive self-concept.

Because the outcomes of the situation do not directly affect observers, they have little motivation to perceive the situation positively. As such, observers are more likely than targets to ignore good events and recognize bad events, as bad events more easily attract a person's attention and have a stronger influence on shaping one's perceptions of a situation compared with good events (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Furthermore, because people use bad events to understand the general meaning of the situation (Gilovich, 1983), observers, as outsiders to the situation, may be more likely to recognize such events in an attempt to understand what is occurring in the situation.

Motivations Related to Group Inclusion

Individuals are not only concerned with how they perceive themselves, but also how they are perceived in the eyes of others (Swann & Bosson, 2010). Thus, individuals are motivated to present a positive image to both themselves and desirable social groups (Schlenker, 1980). Because a person's image in the eyes of others is often shaped by the attitudes and behaviors he or she adopts when interacting with members of the desirable group, situations in which a person has direct interaction with the group will make his or her motivations to be accepted by, or at least not excluded from, the group more salient (e.g., Blackhart, Nelson, Knowles, & Baumeister, 2009). When the initiator of a situation is a member of a desirable group, it is likely that the motivation to be accepted by a situation's initiator and his or her group is more salient for the target than for observers.

As a consequence of salient social motivations, targets may attempt to display attitudes that conform with the group's attitudes (Williams, 2007; Williams, Shore, & Grahe, 1998), which often include perceiving the actions of group members as positive (Crocker & Canevello, 2008; Lakey & Cassady, 1990). Indeed, when people want support from or affiliation with a group, they are more likely to perceive their interactions with group members as positive (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010; Lakey & Cassady, 1990; Uhl-Bien, Graen, & Scandura, 2000). Such a pattern can be found in followers' perceptions of their interactions with leaders. Followers see leaders as desirable associates and often need their support for personal success; consequently, followers tend to perceive their interactions with a leader as more positive than they would had the interaction not been initiated by a leader (Meindl, 1991; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987). Likewise, when individuals strive to gain favorable economic outcomes, they often

perceive the situation positively (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006), which helps to promote positive social exchange with those involved in the interaction (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006) and often results in the desired economic outcomes. Thus, through their heightened motivation to be perceived positively by a desirable social entity, targets are likely to perceive the actions of the group or its members as more positive than negative.

In contrast to targets, observers are not as worried that their attitudes and behaviors will result in exclusion from the group because they, as observers, are not directly involved in the situation and often go unnoticed by group members (Fischer et al., 2011). Without such concerns, social motivations are less salient for observers than targets, which may result in observers not feeling the same motivation as targets to adopt positive perceptions of the situation. The valence of observers' perceptions may instead be shaped by their tendency to recognize the bad events of the situation (Baumeister et al., 2001). And because as outsiders, observers often feel a responsibility to uphold social norms (Sober & Wilson, 1997), they are apt to recognize norm violations, which signal to them that something is wrong in the situation (O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011). These negative signals enhance an observer's cognitive processing of that particular event in the situation (Elsbach & Barr, 1999), resulting in such events having a greater influence in shaping the observer's overall perception of the situation compared with other events in the situation (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Together, these factors result in observers perceiving the situation less positively, and more negatively, than targets.

Summary

The motivational explanations outlined above suggest that information about someone's role as a target or observer in a situation may help inform our understanding regarding the extent to which people perceive a situation as positive or negative. This is not to contest previous research that has demonstrated that all individuals recognize bad events in a situation (Baumeister et al., 2001). Rather, the varying salience of targets' and observers' motivations presented above suggest that although all individuals may focus on bad events, targets are more likely than observers to also attend to good events. Consistent with the above arguments, I propose the following:

Proposition 1: *Observers perceive situations as more negative than do targets.*

Targets' and Observers' Behavioral Responses as a Result of their Perceptions

Individuals' perceptions have been previously linked to their subsequent behavior (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). This linkage occurs because a person uses his or her perceptions to determine the appropriate response in a situation (March, 1995; Messick, 1999). If individuals' situational roles as targets or observers affect their perceptions, and perceptions affect subsequent behavior, then a person's role as a target or an observer may affect the valence of his or her responses in a situation. If individuals' roles are affecting their perceptions through the self and social motivations that are salient to them in a given situation, and these perceptions in turn are affecting subsequent behaviors, individuals' responses will likely follow the same pattern outlined in Proposition 1. Furthermore, because those involved in the situation are given the most attention in the

situation, both targets and observers will likely see the situation's initiator as at least partially responsible for the outcomes and direct their responses toward the initiator. Observers' unique perceptions may also result in them directing their responses toward the targets of the situation. Additionally, because in many cases individuals perceive the initiator's actions as influenced by his or her group, both targets and observers may also direct their responses toward the initiator's group. These responses occur in good, bad, and ambivalent situations, but most research has focused on purely good or bad situations. People have similar patterns of behavior in purely good and bad situations, but, as with perceptions, such patterns may be exacerbated in ambivalent situations.

Targets' and Observers' Responses to Good Situations

In purely good situations targets' and observers' responses differ. Targets generally have positive responses to good situations, as being the beneficiary of another person's actions often makes them feel good about themselves and signals that they are in good standing with the initiator and his or her group (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & Riedl, 1998; Rocklage & Fazio, 2014; Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996). In contrast, because good events usually do not directly benefit observers, and often cannot gain the attention of individuals in the same way that bad events can (Baumeister et al., 2001), observers tend to ignore the interactions they see in good situations. If observers do recognize such interactions, however, they often perceive the situation as less positive for themselves compared with the beneficiary (Ames & Kammrath, 2015), which appears to result in negative responses. Below, I address the valence of targets' and observers' responses to the initiator of the situation and the initiator's group, as well as observers' responses to

targets, in good situations.

Responses toward the person initiating the situation. Targets enjoy being the beneficiary of others' good behavior and often reciprocate such behavior (Bono, Glomb, Shen, Kim, & Koch, 2013; Wang, Galinsky, & Murninghan, 2009). Targets are more trusting and generous toward an initiator who is helpful (Kette, 1986), or promises to be helpful (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008), than an initiator who is not. Targets also engage in forgiveness (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004) and trust (e.g., Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006) and have a positive impression of those who engage in positive actions (e.g., Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murninghan, 2002; Schlenker, Pontari, & Christopher, 2001; Shapiro, 1991). Observers, because they are not the beneficiaries of such behavior, do not feel the same need to reciprocate the positive behavior they see between other parties. Indeed, observers tend to discount the actions of those who initiate positive action toward others beside themselves (Ames & Kammrath, 2015; O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011), which in some cases results in negative responses toward the initiator, including withdrawal behaviors or attempts to punish the initiator (e.g., Duffy & Shaw, 2000; Vecchio, 2000).

Responses toward the group. Group settings feature many interactions that can be observed by others. In some cases, individuals may hold both the situation's initiator and the group itself responsible for the outcomes they experience or observe (Hewstone, 1990). Thus, targets and observers may respond toward the larger group within which they are interacting (e.g., Grant & Gino, 2010), such as the organization (e.g., Brief, Butcher, & Roberson, 1995) in addition to any single individual involved in the situation. When targets feel that they are recipients of positive behavior, they often engage in

subsequent positive behaviors toward the situation's initiator and the initiator's group. For example, after a positive interaction with their manager, targets are more willing to initiate organizationally functional change (Morrison & Phelps, 1999) and engage in organizational citizenship behaviors toward coworkers (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990; Yaffe & Kark, 2011). Observers also see groups as responsible for initiating positive actions toward targets. However, observers tend to have a difficult time understanding why the group would not also give them a similar outcome as the target, which often results in observers minimizing the positive events that others experience (Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004) or punishing the group as well as the individual who initiated the situation (Duffy, Shaw, & Schaubroeck, 2008). Together this suggests that observers respond more negatively toward the group than targets do.

Observers' responses toward the target. Observers additionally appear to have negative responses toward the targets of good situations (Vecchio, 2000). In some cases, when observers recognize others experiencing positive treatment, they attempt to discount such treatment by engaging in negative responses toward the target of the positive actions. Such behavior may include social undermining (Duffy, Scott, Shaw, Tepper, & Aquino, 2012), attempts to eliminate the target's advantageous position (Smith & Kim, 2007), or harmful behavior toward the target (Cohen-Charash, 2009). Together, this work supports the idea that negative responses toward the target often follow an individual's observation of a positive situation.

Targets' and Observers' Responses to Bad Situations

In bad situations, observers' responses tend to be at least as negative as targets' responses. All individuals respond more extremely to negative situations compared with positive situations (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) and subsequently engage in similar negative behaviors (Darley & Latané, 1968; Greenbaum, Mawritz, Mayer, & Priesemuth, 2013; Sanfey, 2007). Like good situations, targets' and observers' responses to bad situations are directed toward the situation's initiator and his or her group; observers' responses additionally can be directed toward the targets of a situation.

Responses toward the person initiating the situation. When targets have negative responses to bad situations, they often direct such responses toward the initiator of the situation rather than others involved in the situation (Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, & Ketelaar, 2005). For example, employees who have an abusive supervisor often retaliate directly against their supervisor (Bowling & Michel, 2011; Neuman & Baron, 1998; Tepper et al., 2009). Likewise, when a person is the target of coworker violence, he or she is willing to respond toward the coworker through negative and aggressive behavior (Andersson & Pearson, 1999).

In ultimatum bargaining games (UBGs)—a one-shot allocation involving an allocator, a recipient, and a sum of money to divide (Croson, Boles, & Murninghan, 2003)—both targets and observers respond to the decisions of an allocator who initiates a negative situation when given the opportunity. Target recipients who perceive that they received a bad offer punish the allocator by rejecting the offer (Boles et al., 2000; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Koning, van Dijk, van Beest, & Steinel, 2010), even when rejecting the offer means losing any gains from the offer (Croson et al., 2003; Güth & Tietz, 1990;

Sanfey, 2007; Straub & Murninghan, 1995). Observers also punish allocators who make low offers to targets, even when they are not directly affected by the bad event, it is costly to their own outcome, or the targets are not themselves willing to punish the allocator (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002). One reason that observers appear to be more determined than targets to punish others is because they perceive such bad events as norm violations (O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011), making them quick to judge (Skitka, 2002) and punish such violators when possible (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Spencer & Rupp, 2009).

Responses toward the group. Targets also have negative responses toward the group associated with the initiator when they experience bad situations. Employees engage in counterproductive behaviors (e.g., Brockner et al., 2007; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), low performance (Riketta, 2008), and fewer extra role behaviors (e.g., Fassina, Jones, Uggerslev, 2008) when they feel that they have been treated badly by a representative of an organization. Likewise, observers tend to engage in negative responses toward the group (Folger, 2001; Greenbaum et al., 2013; O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011). For example, individuals who survived their department's layoffs consequently decreased their commitment to the organization (Brockner et al., 1992). Although both targets and observers engage in such negative behavior, targets tend to respond positively more often than observers do, or at least choose not to respond negatively, toward the larger group in which the bad situation occurred (Glomb, Bhave, Miner, & Wall, 2011; Hoobler & Brass, 2006; Tepper et al., 2009). Thus in bad situations, targets' responses toward the group may not be as consistently negative as observers' responses.

Observers' responses toward the target. According to attribution theory, observers attribute bad events to the behaviors of both the initiators and the targets of the situation (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). As a consequence, observers may punish a target, even in a bad situation in which the target is the victim (Jones & Harris, 1967; Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Consistent with such views, Diekmann, Sillito-Walker, Galinsky, and Tenbrunsel (2013) found that individuals punished victims of sexual harassment by being unwilling to work with the victims and not recommending them for other jobs. Thus, it seems that observers' negative responses can extend even to those who may not be responsible for the outcomes of the situation, but are worse off because of such outcomes.

Summary

Together, the research on good and bad situations reviewed above suggests that similar to the pattern suggested between the valence of targets' and observers' perceptions, observers' responses to a situation are more negative than targets' responses. Indeed, targets' responses are generally positive in good situations, while observers' responses tend to be less positive, and in some cases negative. And while both targets and observers seem to have negative responses to bad situations, observers respond to the situation when targets do not, suggesting that observers have more consistently negative responses than do targets. Given these patterns of behavior, I propose the following:

> ***Proposition 2****: Observers' responses are more negative than targets' responses to a situation*.

As outlined in Propositions 1 and 2, observers tend to be more negative than

targets in their perceptions of a situation and subsequent responses. As suggested above, this may be because an individual's perceptions of a situation often drive his or her responses to the situation (Petty et al., 1995). Indeed, such perceptions lead an individual to respond in ways that he or she considers appropriate (March, 1995; Messick, 1999). Thus, building on Propositions 1 and 2, and consistent with previous research, I propose:

> ***Proposition 3:*** *Perceptions of valence of a situation mediate the relationship between an individual's role as a target or an observer and the valence of his or her response to the situation.*

Reducing Negative Perceptions of Observers through Perspective Taking

If observers focus more on bad, and less on good, events in the situation compared with targets, and individuals observe more situations than they actually experience (Bandura, 1977; Cugueró-Escofet, Fortin, & Canela, 2013), individuals will respond negatively to situations more often than they will respond positively. As argued above, this can in some cases adversely affect the parties involved. Having a negative response can eliminate opportunities to develop a new relationship (Clark & Reis, 1988), be more productive (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), or coordinate with others (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).[1] Such missed opportunities may reduce performance (Riketta 2008) and increase counterproductive behaviors (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007). Assuming that an individual's perceptions of the valence of a situation result in a similarly valenced

---

[1] This is not to say that a lack of cooperation is always negative; research on creativity (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010) and decision making (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001) show that a lack of cooperation can, in some cases, be productive for the organization.

response, and that observers' perceptions are more negative than targets' perceptions, when individuals or groups want to encourage cooperation an important question becomes, how can an observer's negative perceptions of the situation be reduced?

Taking the perspective of the target, who perceives the situation as more positive than observers do, may be one way to encourage positive perceptions in observers. Perspective taking allows observers to understand the point of view of the target, which helps them to align their attributions with those of the target (Regan & Totten, 1975). For example, when observers take the perspective of a person involved in a situation, they make fewer dispositional attributions compared with observers who simply observe the interaction (Storms, 1973).

Yet perspective taking does not only change the attributions individuals make; it also allows individuals to feel closer to those whose perspectives they have adopted (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Galinsky et al., 2005) and better understand others' thought processes (Davis, 1983). Thus perspective taking may help perspective takers adopt the motivations, and not just attributions, of those whose perspective they take. Because targets' self and social motivations arguably encourage their positive perceptions, if observers take a target's perspective of the situation, their negative perceptions may be attenuated because they better understand the target's motivations. As a consequence, observers' responses toward the initiator and target of the situation, as well as the initiator's group after perspective taking, may be more positive than without perspective taking.

Taking the perspective of a target has been shown to reduce observers' negative perceptions in many situations. Take, for example, the research on stereotyping and

perspective taking. Members of groups that are negatively stereotyped tend to dismiss the stereotypes directed toward their group and instead focus on positive aspects of the group, which allows a positive perception of group membership (Crocker & Major, 1989). When individuals outside the stereotyped group (i.e., observers) take the perspective of stereotyped group members, they are likely to adopt a perception of the group that is similar to group members' perceptions (Galinsky et al., 2005; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), which tends to be more positive than the outside individual's original perception (Wang, Ku, Tai, & Galinsky, 2013). Another example of this pattern can be observed in the sexual harassment literature. Victims of sexual harassment often do nothing when they have been harassed (Fitzgerald, Swan, & Fischer, 1995), as they perceive the harassment as a result of situational factors, which allows them to maintain a positive self-concept (Hershcovis & Barling, 2010). Observers of such harassment often have negative perceptions of the victim, as they perceive them as partially responsible for the harassment (Smirles, 2004). However, when observers take the perspective of the sexual harassment victim and consider the motivations likely salient to the victim, their negative perceptions of the victim are reduced (Diekmann et al., 2013). Finally, the relationship between suppliers and customers demonstrates a similar pattern. Suppliers often have a difficult time convincing their customers that a late shipment was not their fault. However, Parker and Axtell (2001) found that customers recognized suppliers' situational constraints more often and had a better relationship with the suppliers when the customers engaged in perspective taking. The common pattern in the examples outlined above suggests that when observers have negative perceptions of a situation, taking the target's perspective may attenuate such perceptions.

Summary

Together, these arguments suggest that targets have a more positive perception of a situation than observers. Observers may be able to adopt more positive perceptions by taking the perspective of the target in the situation, as research on perspective taking has shown that perspective takers identify more with, and understand the motivations of, those whose perspectives they adopt (Davis et al., 1996). Consistent with these arguments, I propose the following:

> ***Proposition 4****: Observers who take a target's perspective have a more positive perception of the situation than observers who do not take a target's perspective.*

Varying Perceptions in Ambivalent Situations and Individuals' Cooperative Responses

Above, I outlined a variety of ways that individuals might respond in a given situation: Individuals may respond toward the person initiating the situation or toward the group to which those involved in the situation belong. Additionally, observers may direct their responses toward the targets of the situation. While responses may be directed toward each of these parties, in this research I focus on how individuals respond toward those who initiate a situation. More specifically, I focus on individuals' cooperative responses towards those who initiate a situation.

Cooperation affects many outcomes including performance (e.g., Beersma et al., 2003; Beersma et al., 2009), interpersonal relationships (e.g., Bazerman, Curhan, & Moore, 2000; De Dreu, 2010; Thompson et al., 2010), and individual satisfaction (Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995). Yet, cooperation can be difficult to maintain when bad events

occur, as individuals can lose the motivation to cooperate with others (Boles et al., 2000; Brockner et al., 2007; Mawritz, Mayer, Hoobler, Wayne, & Marinova, 2012). Once bad events have occurred, it can be difficult for some individuals to cooperate with those who initiated the bad event. For example, when an individual is deceived, he or she is hesitant to work with the deceiver again, even when the deceiver apologizes or behaves positively toward the individual (Schweitzer et al., 2006).

Previous research demonstrates that a person's perceptions affect his or her willingness to cooperate (De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Heilman & Chen, 2005; Kidder & McLean-Parks, 2001; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006). This research suggests that perceptions of a situation's valence—positive, negative, or ambivalent—should affect subsequent cooperative behavior. Examples linking perceptions to cooperative behavior abound in the literature. The name of a game, for example, affects players' perceptions of the competitiveness of the game and how cooperatively they behave toward the other players (Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; Pillutla & Chen, 1999). Likewise, goal compatibility and reward structures affect perceptions and subsequent cooperation (Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002; Thompson & Deharpport, 1998). Individual differences can also affect variation in perceptions of the situation, and subsequently, cooperative behavior. Social value orientation, for example, affects how negotiators perceive the negotiation, leading some negotiators to engage in cooperative behaviors more than others (Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008; Van Lange, 1999). Examining cooperation as an outcome of an individuals' role in the situation may address the calls made by previous research to better understand why individuals' cooperation varies across situations or across

individuals within the same situation (Komoita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992; Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998). Moreover, examining how an individual's role affects his or her perception of the situation's valence may offer insight into why situational roles affect subsequent cooperative behavior.

In Chapter 2, I outline a series of studies that I conducted to understand how an individual's role in the situation affects his or her perception of the situation and subsequent cooperative behavior. The studies aim to create several ambivalent situations, thus assessing how perceptions systematically vary by situational role and affect subsequent cooperative behavior. Next, I develop specific hypotheses related to targets' and observers' perceptions and cooperative behavior toward the initiator of the situation that follow the propositions made previously. Through these studies, a better understanding is gained of how targets' and observers' perceptions differ and why individuals' cooperative behaviors frequently vary.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To examine the propositions from Chapter 1, I create a variety of ambivalent situations that may include targets and observers. Specifically, I develop four sets of hypotheses across five studies related to how targets' and observers' perceptions vary based on what they focus on, and how such perceptions affect cooperative responses toward the initiator of the situation. Studies 1–3 experimentally assess the core hypotheses related to targets' and observers' perceptions and their cooperative behavior. Study 4 assesses the core hypotheses by examining ballet dancers' cooperative behavior in response to performance feedback. Study 5 experimentally assesses the role of perspective taking in attenuating observers' negative perceptions of a situation.

Study 1 examined the main effect of people's roles as targets or observers on their perceptions of the situation in terms of the extent to which they focused on good and bad events in the situation. Specifically, Study 1 asked participants to recall a situation at work, manipulating whether they were asked to recall the situation as a target or an observer. Two raters assessed responses to determine the extent to which individuals discussed positive or negative aspects of the situation. Study 2 assessed individuals' willingness to cooperate by having participants play several rounds of a dictator game with real payouts that were seen as either good or bad. Participants were first assigned to

be the target or the observer in the game, but then were asked to be the allocator, making an allocation to the person who was previously the allocator. Thus participants made an allocation to the person responsible for the outcomes in the first four rounds of the game.

Studies 3 and 4 assessed how the extent to which individuals focus on good and bad events in a situation (i.e., their perceptions of the valence of a situation) mediated the relationship between a person's role as a target or an observer and cooperative behavior toward the initiator of the situation. In Study 3, participants engaged in a hypothetical version of the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) and then reported the extent to which they focused on good and bad events in the situation and their willingness to cooperate with the initiator of the outcomes in the situation. Study 4 assessed the same relationship though a field study, focusing on the performance feedback that students from the University of Utah's Ballet Department received in their technique class. Over a period of six classes, participants were assigned to the role of target or observer and reported the valence of the performance feedback on which they focused during class and their subsequent willingness to cooperate with the class instructor.

Finally, Study 5 used an experiment to assess the extent to which perspective taking encouraged observers to focus more on good events, and less on bad events, in the situation. Once again the dictator game was used to create an ambivalent context. Targets and observers reported the extent to which they focused on the good and bad events. Together, these five studies offer new insight into the effect that a situational role—as target or as observer—has on individuals' perceptions and responses.

Study 1: Targets' and Observers' Focus on Good and Bad Events

The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the varying perceptions of targets and observers. Targets and observers have different perceptions of a given situation (Ross & Nisbett, 1991), which may include variations in perceptions of the situation's valence. An individual's perceptions are shaped by what he or she focuses on in the situation (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Thus, I operationalized perceptions by assessing the extent to which individuals focus on good and bad events in a given situation. As discussed when developing Proposition 1, observers' negative perceptions are shaped by their focus on the bad events in a situation. And while targets' perceptions are also shaped by bad events, their attention to good events makes their perceptions less negative than observers' perceptions. Consistent with this idea, and Proposition 1, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1a*: Observers focus on bad events in a situation more than targets do.*

Hypothesis 1b*: Observers focus on good events in a situation less than targets do.*

Method

Participants. Based on an a priori power analysis expecting a small to moderate effect size, 130 participants (65 women) were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (M-Turk). Participants were paid $1.00. M-Turk is a virtual marketplace in which individuals who need tasks requiring human intelligence completed can find participants. The use of M-Turk is growing; top journals in psychology and management are increasingly accepting M-Turk studies as viable empirical evidence (e.g., Adam &

Shirako, 2013; Chua, 2013; Gere, MacDonald, Joel, Spielmann, & Impett, 2013). Participants from M-Turk have been shown to produce data that have similar reliabilities as more traditional university samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Sprouse, 2011). Furthermore, M-Turk offers researchers the ability to target a broad sample of individuals or a very specific population. Given that I was interested in how individuals perceived situations at work, I used M-Turk to target participants who were currently employed in a variety of industries and with a range of experience. On average, participants were 37 years old and had 12.5 years full-time work experience in industries such as sales and customer service, finance, accounting, marketing, IT, and operations. Seventy-eight percent of participants identified as White, 11% as African American, 4% as Asian, 5% as Hispanic, and 2% as other.

Design and procedure. In Study 1, I manipulated target versus observer to assess how targets and observers perceive the situations that they experience. I chose to use a recall task as it can assess what people are thinking (e.g., Gabriel & Gardner, 1999; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Tamir, 2005). After giving consent to participate, participants were randomly assigned to the role of target or observer. Specifically, participants were asked to read and respond to a prompt, which asked them to recall a situation in which they experienced (or observed) an interaction at work. Targets (observers) read the following:

> *Please recall an incident in which you experienced (observed) an interaction at work between you and another person (two individuals) in which the other (one) person's actions affected you (the other person). By experienced (observed), we mean that you were (were not) directly affected by the person initiating the situation; the other person's actions directly affected (did not affect) you.*

After reading this prompt, participants wrote about the experience they recalled,

answered several demographic questions[2], and were given a code to complete the survey and receive their payment for participation.

Results and Discussion

Two coders, blind to the hypotheses and participants' conditions, coded participants' responses by indicating their agreement with four statements (i.e., the participant recalled bad events, the participant recalled good events, the situation described was bad, the situation described was good) on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. Coders could rate a statement from a participant as high on both good and bad events, which allowed coders' ratings of the extent to which participants focused on good and bad events to be orthogonal, as such constructs have previously been argued to be orthogonal (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). Coders rated one-third of the responses, reconciled any disagreements, and coded the remaining responses. Agreement between coders was sufficient; the ratings for both negative focus, $r(130) = .75$, $p < .001$, and positive focus, $r(130) = .74$, $p < .001$, were high. I created two scales using the coders' ratings: the questions asking about participants' recollection and description of bad events created a negative focus scale ($\alpha = .86$), and the questions about participants' recollection and descriptions of good events created a positive focus scale ($\alpha = .85$).

I conducted two separate one-way ANOVAs to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b with a person's role as a target or an observer as the independent variable and the composite

---

[2] Demographic questions, including race, gender, age, work experience, education, and current employment, were included in every study in this research to assess the nature of the sample completing the study, and in turn, the generalizability of the studies' outcomes. No formal hypotheses related to these demographic questions were made in any of the studies.

rating for negative or positive focus as the dependent variable. Offering partial support for Hypothesis 1a, there was a small difference between targets (M = 4.71, SD = 1.10) and observers (M = 5.01, SD = .82) in the extent to which they focused on bad events in the situation, $F(1, 130) = 3.04$, $p = .084$, $\eta^2 = .02$; observers tended to focus more on bad events in a situation compared with targets. Supporting Hypothesis 1b, targets (M = 4.21, SD = 1.43) focused more on good events in the situation than observers (M = 3.63, SD = 1.66), $F(1,130) = 4.58$, $p = .034$, $\eta^2 = .04$. These results demonstrate that, as predicted, observers focus less on good events in a situation compared with targets (see Figure 1).

Overall, the results from Study 1 support Proposition 1 by suggesting that observers' perceptions of the situation are more negative and less positive than targets'



Figure 1: *Extent to which participants focused on good and bad events in the situation they described, as rated by external judges.*

perceptions of the situation's valence was primarily due to the differences between their focus on good events in the situation. The weaker support for Hypothesis 1a suggests that both targets and observers focus to some extent on bad events in the situation. This is not surprising, given that individuals in most situations tend to be biased toward bad events (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzmann, 2001). The pattern of results from Study 1 suggests that the differences between positive and negative perceptions of the overall situation may be driven more by the extent to which individuals focus on the good events than by the extent to which they focus on the bad events in the situation.

Study 2: Cooperation in Response to Positive and Negative Allocations

Study 1 demonstrated that observers' perceptions of a situation are more negative and less positive than targets' perceptions. Individuals' actions tend to be consistent with their perceptions of the situation, as such perceptions affect what behaviors individuals perceive as appropriate (March, 1995; Messick, 1999). Building on Proposition 1, which focused on perceptions, Proposition 2 suggested that observers respond more negatively than targets respond in a situation. Thus, it seems likely that an observer, compared with a target, has more negative, and less positive, responses toward the person initiating the situation. As stated previously, because of the implications that cooperation has for the organization (Beersma et al., 2003) and for individual satisfaction (Smith et al., 1995), I examined cooperative behavior as a response in this research. Based on the pattern proposed in Proposition 2, observers, relative to targets, engage in less cooperative behavior toward the individual initiating the situation. Consistent with this logic and

Proposition 2, I suggest the following:

Hypothesis 2*: Observers cooperate less with the initiator of a situation than targets do.*

Allocation exercises such as ultimatum bargaining games (UBGs) and dictator games have been used in previous research examining cooperative behavior. Such games have been manipulated to create bad situations by allocating targets (i.e., allocation recipients) almost nothing or good situations by giving targets a generous allocation (Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). Studies 2, 3, and 5 modified this approach to create an ambivalent situation by using repeated allocation games in which several rounds of good and bad allocations were made.

Method

Participants. Based on the results of an a priori power analysis anticipating a small effect size, I collected data from 350 participants (168 women). These participants were recruited from M-Turk in exchange for payment of up to $1.75. Participants received $0.25 for participating in the study and up to $1.50 as a bonus depending on the decisions they made during the game. On average, participants were 35 years old. Seventy-five percent of participants identified themselves as White, 8% as African-American, 9% as Asian, 5% as Hispanic, and 3% as "other." Although employment was not a requirement in this study, 73% of participants were employed.

Design and procedure. Study 2 was designed to examine the effect of a person's role as a target or observer on their cooperative behavior. Study 2 had two conditions, target or observer, and examined both actual cooperative behavior and self-reports of

individuals' willingness to cooperate. After giving consent to participate in this study, participants learned that they would be playing a dictator game. The dictator game is a form of a UBG in which the target (i.e., allocation recipient) does not have the ability to accept or reject the offer made to him or her by the allocator. The dictator game used in this study had three roles: an allocator, who was assigned to allocate a sum of money between themself and a target; a target, who received a portion of the sum of money that the allocator gave to them but had no say in how much money they received and could not accept or reject the offer made; and an observer, a person who witnessed the game but did not gain anything from the allocation. Participants were described the roles of allocator, target, and observer and told that they would be assigned one of these roles. Participants were also informed that the other two roles in the game would be assigned to the other two members of their group—an experimenter and another participant—and that this group would stay intact for the duration of the study. Participants learned that one allocation made by the allocator was considered one round of the game, and after each round, participants may be reassigned to a new role. For the first four rounds, the role of the allocator was always played by the experimenter, who had predetermined decisions that were made across the four rounds of the game. The two participants were randomly assigned to play the role of target or observer in the first four rounds. Participants were informed that they would receive the money from one round of the game that they actually played (rather than observed).[3] Paying participants a fraction of the money they earn in a UBG has been successful at eliciting real decisions from

---

[3] All participants received the money from the last game, as all participants were assigned to be the allocator and chose how much of the available money (e.g., $1.50) they wanted to keep for themselves.

participants in previous studies (e.g., Turillo et al., 2002).

Targets were told that they would receive an offer from the allocator in each round of the game. Observers were told that they would be observing games between an allocator and a target. After receiving their roles, all participants read the instructions for the dictator game (see Appendix A). Participants then participated in four rounds of the game in the role they were assigned in the first round.

During the four rounds of the dictator game, two rounds resulted in allocations that did not favor the target (targets were allocated $0.25 and $0.30 from the $1.50 sum), and two rounds resulted in allocations that favored the target (targets were allocated $0.80 and $0.95 from the $1.50 sum). Based on previous research, allocators rarely give more than 50% of the sum to a target (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994), and thus such offers appear to be generous. I counterbalanced the good and bad events in the game (i.e., stingy and generous rounds) so that participants were randomly assigned the order in which they experienced or observed good or bad events in the situation. By counterbalancing the good and bad events in the situation, primacy and recency effects that bias what people focus on in a given situation (e.g., Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, & Usher, 2005; Page & Norris, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) could be ruled out as alternative explanations. Two orthogonal contrasts were set up to compare ordering effects. The first contrast, which assessed any primacy effects, compared responses when good (coded as 1) and bad (coded as -1) outcomes were delivered first. This contrast demonstrated no differences in allocations made based on whether a good or bad outcome was given in Round 1, $t(346) = -.73$, $p = .468$. The second contrast examined responses to recency effects, comparing

how people responded when good (coded as 1) and bad (coded as -1) outcomes were given in the last round. The results of this analysis also showed no differences in allocations made based on the order of the allocations, $t(346) = .04$, $p = .969$

After the fourth round of the dictator game, participants were informed that the roles in the game were reassigned (but that the group members would stay the same). All participants then engaged in a single round of the dictator game as the allocator and were told that the allocator in the previous rounds had been assigned to be the target. The amount of money that participants allocated to the target of the fifth round of the game was used as the dependent variable representing cooperation. Following this round, the game was over.

Participants were asked to fill out an adapted version of the "Feelings About the Relationship" subscale of the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI), as it assesses willingness to cooperate (Curhan et al., 2006). One question, "how satisfied are you with your relationship with your partner?" was removed from the subscale because both groups could not answer the question. An additional item, "To what extent would you be willing to work with the allocator from rounds 1–4 in a future exercise?" was included in the measure instead. All items were measured on a 1 to 7 scale that corresponded with each question (see Appendix B). Participants responded to a manipulation check question, which asked them which role—target, observer, or allocator—they were first assigned. To conclude, participants answered demographic questions and were paid.

Results and Discussion

I conducted a multinominal logistic regression using maximum likelihood estimation to assess whether the role manipulations made participants perceive themselves correctly as the target or observer in the game. The results of this analysis suggested that the role manipulations worked as expected; 99% of those assigned to be targets recognized their role as such, and 95% of participants assigned to be observers recognized their role as an observer, $\chi^2 = 375.62$, $p < .001$.

To test Hypothesis 2, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with participants' allocations in the fifth round of the dictator game as the dependent variable and role as a target (coded as 0) or observer (coded as 1) in the first four rounds as the between-subjects factor. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the allocations that targets made were larger (M = \$0.54, SD = \$0.45) than the allocations that observers made (M = \$0.44, SD = \$0.35), suggesting that targets were more cooperative toward the situation's initiator than observers, $F(1, 349) = 5.45$, $p = .02$, $\eta 2 = .02$ (see Figure 2).

Next, I created a scale based on the adapted version of the SVI (Curhan et al., 2006) to further assess Hypothesis 2. I combined the items listed in Appendix B to create the SVI scale, which measured cooperation ($\alpha = .82$). I conducted a one-way ANOVA, with participants' role as the independent variable and the SVI scale as the dependent variable. The results of this analysis failed to support Hypothesis 2, $F(1, 244) = 1.05$, $p = .307$: Targets (M = 4.17, SD = 1.03) and observers (M = 4.32, SD = 1.18) were similarly willing to cooperate with the allocator (see Figure 3).

Participants' self-reported willingness to work with the allocator in the future was not affected by a person's role in the situation, counter to what was expected. The reason



Figure 2: *Allocations made by targets and observers in Study 2 during the final round of the game.*



Figure 3: *Average ratings of the Subjective Value Inventory from targets and observers.*

for this is unclear and discussed further in the General Discussion. One possible explanation, however, may be related to the study design. Participants knew that the allocator in the previous rounds was an experimenter rather than a participant. Based on the seemingly neutral ratings from participants on the SVI measure in the study, it may have been that participants were reluctant to indicate their willingness to cooperate with an experimenter, assuming that the experimenter had some kind of influence on the outcomes in the game. Unfortunately, this speculation could not be confirmed by Study 2, but could be tested in Study 3, which used a similar game, but did not have the experimenter act as a member of the group.

Consistent with the theory proposed above, the pattern of results in Study 2 demonstrated the same pattern as the results in Study 1: Observers were more negative than targets. This is likely because individuals' perceptions guide their subsequent behavior (March, 1995). Given the link between perceptions and behavior, and the pattern observed across Studies 1 and 2, it seems that the positivity or negativity of a person's perceptions, or the extent to which he or she focuses on good and bad events, should mediate the relationship between a person's role as a target or an observer and his or her subsequent cooperative responses. Consistent with this logic and Proposition 3, I propose the following hypotheses:

> ***Hypothesis 3a****: The extent to which an individual focuses on bad events in a situation mediates the relationship between the individual's role as a target or an observer and his or her willingness to cooperate with the initiator of the situation.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 3b****: The extent to which an individual focuses on good events in a situation mediates the relationship between the individual's role as a target or an*

observer and his or her willingness to cooperate with the initiator of the situation.

Study 3: The Role of Focus in Cooperative Responses of Targets and Observers

The purpose of Study 3 was to understand how individuals' perceptions of a situation affected their subsequent cooperative responses by assessing Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Thus, this study offers insight into why observers are not as willing as targets to cooperate. I assessed Hypotheses 1a–3b in this study, but did so in a trust game scenario (Berg et al., 1995), which is a slightly different ambivalent situation compared with Study 2. Previous research has used this game to understand how cooperative behaviors change over time (i.e., over repeated rounds; Rotella, Richeson, Chiao, & Bean, 2013). Here, however, I used this game to establish an ambivalent situation, having the allocator make both good and bad allocations to the target.

The first two rounds of this study included bad events (i.e., receiving nothing), and the latter two rounds included good events (i.e., receiving everything). Previous research has demonstrated that targets generally respond positively toward the allocator in such situations (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2006), which demonstrates the pattern outlined by Hypothesis 2 for targets. By ordering the good and bad events in this way, this study is similar to remedial actions, another ambivalent situation common to organizations in which good behavior follows by bad behavior (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010).

Method

Participants. Based on a power analysis conducted by Fritz and MacKinnon (2007) for mediation analyses using bootstrapping procedures and anticipating small to moderate effects, the recommended sample size was 159. Consistent with this, 160 M-Turk participants (71 women) completed this study for payment of $0.75. On average, participants were 29 years old, and 75% were employed. Seventy-nine percent of participants identified as White/Caucasian, 3% as African-American, 10% as Asian, 3% as Hispanic, and the remaining 9% identified as "other."

Design and procedure. This study was designed to examine the mediation hypotheses proposed and thus included two conditions, target and observer. Upon agreeing to participate in the study, participants were randomly assigned to be the target (Player A) or observer in a scenario-based version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995), a multiple round ultimatum bargaining game in which Player A has a sum of $6 that they must choose how to manage: Player A has the option of keeping all $6 or passing all $6 in each round. If Player A keeps all $6, the round is over. If Player A passes all $6 to his/her partner (Player B), rather than keeping it, the money triples immediately, but Player B also has the choice to keep $18, or give Player A $9 or $18. Thus, Player A must trust Player B to gain a greater return, as Player A earns more money with the help of Player B.

Participants were first given instructions about the trust game scenario. Participants in the *target* condition were asked to imagine themselves as Player A in the game. After reading the instructions, targets were told that they had already played four rounds with Player B and were shown the outcomes for all four rounds. After seeing the

outcomes of all four games, targets were asked their willingness to cooperate with Player B in subsequent games. Participants in the observer condition were given the same information as targets about the game, but were asked to imagine that they had observed four rounds of a game between two individuals. After reading about the four rounds, observers were also asked their willingness to cooperate with Player B in subsequent games (see Appendix C). To create an ambivalent situation, the target in all four rounds passed the money to Player B: In rounds 1 and 2, Player B decided to keep all $18 (i.e., bad events), and in rounds 3 and 4, Player B gave all $18 to the target (i.e., good events).

I pretested the good and bad events outlined above to ensure that the bad events were rated as strongly negative as the good events were rated positive. Fifty participants (29 women) participated in this study through M-Turk. All participants were assigned the role of Player B in the trust game outlined above and were told what their allocations were across the four rounds. The Player B role was used in this game to ensure that the results were not biased toward the perceptions of either targets or observers in the actual game. At the end of the game, participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive) the perceived negativity and positivity of each allocation. The ratings of the bad allocations (i.e., the allocator keeps all the money) were reverse scored and compared with the ratings of the good allocations (i.e., the allocator gives recipients all of the money), with the expectation that once reversed, the ratings of the bad and good events would not be different. Indeed, the results demonstrated that the reversed-scored ratings of the bad events (M = 2.57, SD = .84) and the good events (M = 2.41, SD = 1.17) were about the same, $t(48) = .43$, p = .673, 95% CI [-.23, .35].

In the main study, after reading the scenario, participants answered a number of

questions about the game, Player B's decisions, and their own decisions. Most important, participants indicated how willing they were to work with Player B in the upcoming rounds of the game and the events in the situation that they focused on to make this decision. To conclude, participants were asked to fill out several demographics questions.

Measures

To test Hypotheses 1–3b, I used several measures to assess participants' focus during the situation and how they intended to respond to Player B.

Focus. To measure focus, I used the *focusing illusion,* defined as the extent to which an individual focuses on certain elements of the situation (Loewenstein & Fredrick, 1997; Shakade & Kahneman, 1998). Previous work on the focusing illusion has found that individuals may focus on a single subset of events in a situation (e.g., Shakade & Kahneman, 1998; Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson, 2005). The focusing illusion has been measured in the following way: After participants make a decision regarding their behavior, they are asked to rate the extent to which they focused on several key events from the situation on a scale of 1 (did not focus on this at all) to 11 (focused on this a lot). In this exercise, participants were asked how much they focused on Player B's decision to keep all the money in the first two rounds (i.e., the bad event) and Player B's decision to give the target all the money in rounds 3 and 4 (i.e., the good event).

Willingness to cooperate. I assessed participants' responses to Player B by examining their willingness to cooperate with Player B in upcoming rounds of the game, just as in Study 2. Thus, I used the same adapted measure of the SVI (Curhan et al., 2006) outlined in Study 2 to measure participants' willingness to cooperate.

Manipulation check and demographics. Participants were asked to fill out a manipulation check about the trust game scenario that they played, which asked which role they were assigned during the game in the study. Participants also answered demographic questions including age, race, gender, education, and employment status.

Results and Discussion

To ensure that the manipulation of participants' roles worked as intended, I conducted a multinominal logistic regression analysis with participants' assigned conditions as targets or observers as the independent variable and their report of their role as the allocator, recipient target, or observer as the dependent variable. The results of the analysis suggested that the manipulation worked, $\chi^2 = 159.00$, $p < .001$; participants assigned to the target condition reported that they were the target recipient in the game 92% of the time, and those assigned to the observer condition reported that they were the observer of the game 100% of the time.

I used bootstrapping methods suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2008, 2009) with 10,000 bootstrapping samples to assess mediation, which also allowed me to assess Hypotheses 1a–2. As a first step in the mediation, I examined the total effects model. I included a person's role as a target (coded as 0) or observer (coded as 1) as the independent variable and willingness to cooperate with Player B as the dependent variable. A person's role as a target (Player A) or observer did not affect willingness to cooperate with Player B, $B = -.33$, $SE = .20$, $p = .10$, 95% CI [-.73 .07]; observers ($M = 2.37$, $SD = 1.09$) and targets ($M = 2.70$, $SD = 1.43$) were similarly willing to cooperate with the initiator of the situation. Despite a lack of support for Hypothesis 2, recent

research has argued that it is not required that there be a main effect between the independent and dependent variable for an indirect effect to occur (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Thus, I next assessed the possibility of an indirect effect that would support Hypotheses 3a and 3b. I examined the relationships proposed in Hypotheses 1a and 1b between a person's role as a target or an observer and the extent to which the participant focused on good and bad events in the situation. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, a person's role affected the extent to which he or she focused on bad events in the situation (Hypothesis 1a), $B = .85$, $SE = .37$, $p = .024$, 95% CI [.11, 1.58]: Observers focused more on bad events ($M = 9.98$, $SD = 1.54$) than targets did ($M = 9.13$, $SD = 2.96$). Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, a person's role affected the extent to which he or she focused on good events in the situation (Hypothesis 1b), $B = -1.45$, $SE = .50$, $p = .004$, 95% CI [-2.43, -.47]: Observers focused less on good events ($M = 2.74$, $SD = 2.72$) than did targets ($M = 4.19$, $SD = 3.52$).

I next assessed the relationship between the extent to which individuals focused on good and bad events in the situation and their willingness to cooperate with Player B using the adapted version of the subjective value inventory scale outlined in Appendix B ($\alpha = .93$). Consistent with the mediation hypotheses, the extent to which individuals focused on bad events in the situation, $B = -.22$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.30, -.14], and the extent to which individuals focused on good events in the situation, $B = .08$, $SE = .03$, $p = .017$, 95% CI [.02, .13], affected their subsequent willingness to cooperate with Player B. Specifically, as individuals focused more on good events and less on bad events they were more willing to cooperate with Player B. Furthermore, with the mediators included in the model, a person's role as a target or observer did not have an effect on his

or her willingness to cooperate with Player B, B = -.04, SE = .19, p = .849, 95% CI [-.41 .34]. The 95% confidence interval for the dual mediation model also did not include zero, [-.53, -.14], nor did the 95% confidence intervals for either the extent to which individuals focused on bad events [-.36, -.05] or the extent to which they focused on good events [-.29, -.02]. These results offer support for both Hypotheses 3a and 3b by demonstrating that the extent to which individuals focus on bad and good events in a situation fully mediates the relationship between their role and their willingness to cooperate with Player B (see Figure 4).

The results of Study 3 demonstrated a key tenet of the theory offered above, extending the research on targets and observers by demonstrating that the situational role a person takes as a target or an observer affects his or her perceptions of a situation's



Figure 4: *Mediating effect of a person's focus on the relationship between his/her role and willingness to cooperate, Hypotheses 1a–3b. Regression coefficients are unstandardized betas; standard errors are in parentheses.*
****p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10.*

valence and subsequent responses. Furthermore, this research demonstrated that by perceiving a situation's valence differently, individuals vary in their willingness to cooperate with those involved in a situation. But, amid the complexities of an actual organization, would the mediation found in Study 3 occur? In Study 4 I addressed this question.

Study 4: Ballet Dancers' Responses to Good and Bad Performance Feedback

The goal of Study 4 was to validate the findings from Study 3 in a field setting. Given this goal, in Study 4 I examined how a class of ballet dancers, who are targets and observers of the instructor's feedback, responded to ambivalent performance feedback situations during their technique class. This setting models an organization in several ways. First, students in technique courses are developing their skills as professional ballet dancers; thus the work they do in the course is directly relevant to their careers. Second, the student cohort has both cooperative and competitive elements. For example, dancers must improve their technique individually so that the class improves as a company. This allows the class to improve their performance, which ensures that more performers get performing jobs. At the same time, dancers are constantly competing with one another for lead roles in performances. These conditions make this course an appropriate setting to examine how individuals respond to ambivalent situations, as such courses directly affect performance of the individual as well as the company and thus encourage class members to focus on the feedback given. Dancers in classes similar to this technique class take the performance feedback that they receive very personally because of the link between such

feedback and professional outcomes (Bracey, 2004). Furthermore, because performance feedback is often public, performers, such as dancers, feel pressure to adapt their performance to the feedback they receive, ensuring that the importance of the feedback is salient (Baumeister, 1984).

Method

Participants. Participants in this study were from the University of Utah Department of Ballet's freshman class. Thirty-one students were enrolled in the class. Two students attended class only part-time and thus declined to participate. Two full-time students also declined to participate, leaving 27 participants in the study (26 women). Students attended class twice each week for 2 hours. On average, participants had been dancing for 13 years; it was all dancers' first experience dancing full time (i.e., 8–10 hours a day in various classes including the class used in this research, 5 days a week). Dancers' average age was 18, and 10% of dancers had previous professional experience. All dancers indicated that their purpose for being in the program was to be a professional dancer.

Design and procedure. This study was a quasi-experimental design, manipulating participants' roles as either target or observer in a situation in a natural setting. The first day of class was used as an information session for students about the department. During this first class, students also learned about the current study and were given the opportunity to decide whether they would like to participate. The study began on the second day of class; at this time, students who agreed to participate were randomly assigned to the role of target or observer. Those assigned the role of target were asked to

focus on the performance feedback they personally received during each class. Those assigned to the role of observer were asked to focus on the performance feedback that the person standing next to them during class received during each class. Although not assigned, students typically stood in the same place in class, which often resulted in observers focusing on the feedback that one or two people received throughout the entire study given that this was all they could hear over the music played in class: In 82% of cases, observers focused on no more than two other dancers' feedback during class.[4] Participants were assigned to act as either a target or an observer for all class sessions (i.e., assignments did not change across classes), and each participant was reminded about his/her role before each class. For a period of 6 weeks, the instructor's performance feedback was video-recorded during class on a weekly basis.[5] The videos were coded for good and bad feedback to ensure that each class created an ambivalent situation: none of the classes recorded included only good or only bad feedback. The mix of feedback ranged from 30% good/ 70% bad to 34% good/ 66% bad during the six class sessions recorded.

Within 24 hours after each recorded class, participants were asked to fill out a survey about the performance feedback they received, or observed others receiving, during class. This time restriction was enforced to ensure that participants responded to the questions regarding the class that was recorded, rather than other classes that they attended that week. A survey link was emailed to each participant immediately after each

---

[4] All participants were the targets of the instructor's feedback as some point during class; thus every participant could hear feedback directed towards others in the class.

[5] Students who declined to participate in the study also gave their consent to be filmed.

class. Students who participated in every survey were entered into a drawing for a cash prize of $100. On the last day of class, the class was recorded so the instructor could rate each student's improvement in the class. Participants were not required to complete a survey following this class session.

Measures

To assess Hypotheses 1–3b, I used measures that assessed the valence of each student's focus and his or her willingness to cooperate with the feedback giver (i.e., the instructor). Although participants' roles as targets or observers were randomly assigned, I included several controls in the model including how useful participants perceived the feedback they were given and the amount of actual positive and negative feedback they personally received during class. The perceived usefulness of feedback was assessed in the survey following each of the six class sessions. The actual positive and negative feedback that participants received was assessed from the video recordings of each class. Additional controls were included in the first survey; these assessed participants' dance experience and their tendency to be cooperative using individual difference measures. These and other key measures are described below.

Good and bad feedback. The performance feedback each participant received in each class was coded as positive or negative by the experimenter and three independent coders who each have extensive background in ballet. Feedback was coded by the experimenter as positive when the following feedback was given: encouragement to continue in the same form, indication of improvement from a previous critique, a request for the student to demonstrate to other students the dance move, or an indication that the

student was improving. Feedback was coded as negative when the following feedback was given: critique of a form, physical fixing of a person's form, or a request to perform the move again (but not in front of the other students). Once the first class session was coded by the experimenter, an experienced dancer independently coded the first class session and explained adjustments to the experimenter's codings that needed to be made: The remaining class sessions were then coded by the experimenter. The two additional coders coded four of the six class sessions independently of the experimenter. Reliability between these codings and the experimenter's codings was acceptable for both positive feedback, $r(99) = .81$, $p < .001$, and negative feedback, $r(99) = .91$, $p < .001$. All feedback was linked to the target of the feedback, which allowed for the actual good and bad feedback that participants received each day to be controlled for and ensure that the results of the study were not due to participants receiving more positive or negative feedback. In most cases, participants did not receive an equal amount of positive and negative feedback in a given day. The average codings from each day of class were examined to ensure that each class created an ambivalent situation, or in other words included both negative and positive feedback to students and/or the class as a whole.

Self/other feedback and focus. I used cognitive elaboration, which identifies the events in a situation that participants focus on most (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979), to assess the extent to which individuals focused on positive and negative feedback. This measure uses self-report responses. In the survey, participants were asked to write about four pieces of feedback from the instructor that they received, or heard, that stuck out to them during class. After writing about four events, participants were asked to indicate whether each piece of feedback was good or bad by placing a "+" or "-" by the positive and

negative feedback, respectively. Thus, this measure assessed good and bad events in a slightly different way compared with the previous studies by forcing participants to choose whether the events were more positive than negative, or more negative than positive. Because many studies assessing valence assume that positivity and negativity are the endpoints on a single continuum rather than assuming that positivity and negativity are orthogonal (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring, & Greenberg, 1989), this measure allowed me to assess whether, if forced to determine the valence of a situation as *either* positive or negative, a similar pattern of results would emerge as when the positivity and negativity of a person's focus was assumed to be orthogonal. Additionally, I asked participants to answer several questions about each response they gave, to gauge the relative importance of each event included on the list using an adapted version of the cognitive elaboration measure by Reynolds (1997). Participants were asked the questions from this measure that addressed the extent to which they thought about each event, answering each question on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. These items were intended to be used as a control and can be found in Appendix D.

Cooperation. To assess their willingness to cooperate with the instructor, participants answered the following questions on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) scale: "How much would you like to work with this instructor in the future?"; "How willing are you to accept feedback from this instructor?"; "How much do you trust the instructor?"; and "How interested are you in the instructor's perspective or opinion?" I adapted these questions from O'Connor, Arnold, and Burris (2005) and combined them to create a scale measure of participants' willingness to cooperate with the instructor ($\alpha = .87$).

Performance. Following the last round of responses from participants, the class was filmed one final time. The instructor, blind to the condition assigned to each student, then coded each participant's improvement over the course of the 6 weeks. Specifically, the instructor was asked to rate each student on how much he or she had improved during the class on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal). These improvement scores acted as an additional measure of cooperation, as willingness to accept the instructor's feedback and cooperate with the suggestions made is a large part of how a dancer improves his or her technique.

Additional questions. At the beginning of each survey, participants were asked whether they paid attention to the feedback they received or the feedback that someone else received. This question was used as a manipulation check to ensure that participants knew their role during class. To conclude the survey, participants were asked two questions: "The feedback I (the other person) received today helped me learn how to improve my performance" (Anseel, Lievens, & Schollaert, 2009), which was measured on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale and used as a control variable. The second question, "How anxious are you to work with the instructor in the next class session?", was rated on a scale of 1 (not at all anxious) to 7 (very anxious) and included to further assess participants' resistance to work with the instructor.[6]

In the survey following the first class session, students filled out several questions that were used as control variables. Participants answered questions regarding the agreeableness dimension of the Big Five (Costa & McCrae, 1985), using a personality

---

[6] This was a last-minute suggestion made by the Ballet Department Chair to use as a dependent variable.

assessment which asks participants to assess themselves on several characteristics related to agreeableness using a 1 (extremely inaccurate) to 9 (extremely accurate) scale (Saucier, 1994). Agreeableness has been shown to affect individuals' willingness to cooperate with others (Koole, Jager, van den Berg, Vlek, & Hofstee, 2001). Participants also responded to demographic questions including gender, to ensure that men (who are the clear minority in the class) were not treated differently or consistently responding differently than women; years dancing; and professional experience (coded as 0 for no experience, or 1 for experience), including whether they have had any lead roles (coded as 0 for no lead roles, or 1 for having lead roles), all of which assessed participants' experience in receiving feedback, which may have affected how they responded to the feedback they received (Barrell & Terry, 2003; Walker & Nordin-Bates, 2010).[7]

Results and Discussion

Two participants repeatedly complained about their assigned role as an observer, claiming it was affecting their performance in the class. In both cases, participants stated in their complaints that they would not continue to do as their instructions asked. Additionally, two participants either missed class or skipped the survey more than twice. These participants were removed from the analysis, leaving 23 participants in the study.[8]

Because feedback was nested within classes, I assessed the data to see whether multilevel analyses were required. Previous work on multilevel analyses suggests that the

---

[7] Many of these controls were determined through discussion with the Chair of the Ballet Department and based on specific differences and challenges that are unique to dancers.

[8] Note that the results reported below are when those who complained and those who missed more than two surveys were removed from the analysis. Results including these individuals are included in footnotes.

interclass correlation (ICC) of the dataset is a good assessment of whether the data necessitate multilevel analysis (Luke, 2004). Higher ICC values indicate that the level 1 variables contribute little knowledge to the model over and above level 2 variables (Scherbaum & Ferreter, 2009). Accordingly, I calculated the ICC using the class session as the independent variable and the difference score between the average amount of good and bad feedback for each class session as the dependent variable. The ICC value suggested that there was not enough difference across each class session to necessitate multilevel analyses, ICC(1) = .13, 95% CI [-.05, .30]. Furthermore, it is recommended that the higher level data have 30 or more unique observations for reliable multilevel analyses (Maas & Hox, 2005), which means that 30 or more class sessions would need to be recorded. In this research, there were only six unique observations (i.e., class sessions), suggesting that the number of observations recommended for multilevel analyses was too low. Based on the results of the ICC calculation, as well as the low number of class sessions, I chose not to use multilevel analyses; rather, I assessed the results at the individual level using bootstrapping, as suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2008, 2009), and controlling for the class session to ensure that any effect was not explained by a particular class session.

To ensure that the manipulation of participants' roles worked, I conducted a binary logistic regression analysis with the participants' assigned conditions as the independent variable and their report of whether they were told to focus on their own or others feedback as the dependent variable. The results of the analysis suggested that the manipulation worked, $\chi^2 = 122.37$, $p < .001$; participants assigned to the target condition reported that they were asked to recall the feedback that they received 95% of the time,

and those assigned to the observer condition reported that they were asked to recall feedback that others received 95% of the time.

The four items outlined by O'Connor and colleagues (2005) were combined to create a scale representing participants' willingness to cooperate ($\alpha = .86$). The items comprising the agreeableness scale from the Big Five (Costa & McCrae, 1985) were also combined ($\alpha = .82$). To create a measure of focus, the number of times each participant rated the four items of feedback they recalled during class as negative was counted; thus higher numbers represented an increased focus on the negative aspects of the situation, which in using the cognitive elaboration measure, and also resulted in a decreased focus on positive aspects of the situation.

Descriptive statistics and correlations among the study variables are listed in Table 1. I used participants' self-reported willingness to cooperate with the instructor, as measured by O'Connor and colleagues' (2005) scale, as the dependent variable. To examine Hypotheses 3a and 3b, I used bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, 2009) with 10,000 samples.[9] First the total effects model was assessed. No relationship was found between a person's role as a target (coded as 0; $M = 6.66$, $SD = .47$) or an observer (coded as 1; $M = 6.55$, $SD = .49$) and his or her self-reported willingness to cooperate with the instructor, $B = -.12$, $SE = .09$, $p = .19$, 95% CI [-.29, .06]; therefore, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Given that a main effect between the independent and dependent

---

[9] Note that when including those who complained and who missed two or more surveys, the results of the study did not support the hypotheses, although continued to be in the same direction as the reported results in the main text. Specifically, participants' roles as targets or observers had no effect on their cooperative behaviors, $B = .02$, $SE = .09$, $p = .852$, 95% CI [-.16, .19]. Additionally, there was no effect of participants' roles on the extent to which they focused on negative feedback, $B = .06$, $SE = .18$, $p = .75$, 95% CI [-.29, .41], and the indirect effect of the model included zero in the confidence interval, 95% CI [-.01, .19], suggesting that no indirect effect occurred.

Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and correlations (Study 4)

	M	SD	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
(1) Role	0.48	0.5	-															
(2) Positive/Negative Focus	1.56	0.94	.18*	-														
(3) Cooperation (Self-report)	6.61	0.48	-.12	.31**	-													
(4) Cooperation (Instructor rating)	4.71	1.81	.31**	.35**	.41**	-												
(5) Anxiety to work with instructor	3.89	2.2	-.08	.35**	.11	.04	-											
(6) Class session	3.64	2.02	-.04	-.18	-.13	.10	-.10	-										
(7) Actual negative feedback	2.78	1.92	-.02	.07	-.01	-.14	-.11	.05	-									
(8) Actual positive feedback	1.4	1.06	.10	-.13	.19	.25*	.01	.21	-.08	-								
(9) Perceived feedback usefulness	6.42	0.9	-.30**	.11	.23*	-.10	.04	-.18	.11	-.09	-							
(10) Years dancing	12.84	3.18	-.15	-.09	.09	.04	.22*	.03	-.34**	.19	-.24*	-						
(11) Professional experience	1.96	0.2	-.22	.13	.05	.08	.06	.16	.08	.14	.04	-.21*	-					
(12) Gender	0.02	0.16	.04	.07	-.13	.15	-.12	.19*	.01	.11	-.11	.53**	-.03	-				
(13) Trait agreeableness	7.38	1.29	-.08	.14	.07	.04	.22*	.10	.07	-.19	.12	.02	-.10	.26**	-			
(14) Focus intensity	5.74	0.88	-.30**	.24**	.35**	.07	.12	.04	.20*	-.07	.44**	-.10	.11	.15	.37**	-		
(15) Actual negative feedback X Focus intensity	16.1	12.2	-.04	.13	.04	-.07	-.09	.06	.98**	-.10	.18	-.37**	.09	.05	.15	.36**	-	
(16) Actual positive feedback X Focus intensity	8.12	6.36	.06	-.08	.25**	.24*	.06	.20	-.07	.97**	-.02	.19	.13	.13	-.13	.14	-.06	-

Note: N = 23. Role is coded Target = 0, Observer = 1. Actual negative and positive feedback is a count of the number of times each type of feedback was given per person per class, on average. Gender is coded Female = 0, Male = 1. Focus intensity is participants' self-reported cognitive elaboration using Reynolds (1997) scale. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

variable is not required for an indirect effect (MacKinnon et al., 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 2002), an indirect effect of participants' roles on cooperative behavior through the extent to which they focused on good and bad feedback was examined. Consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b, being a target or an observer affected the extent to which participants focused on negative feedback, $B = .36$, $SE = .17$, $p = .036$, 95% [.02, .70]: Observers focused more on negative feedback ($M = 1.74$, $SD = 1.09$) than did targets ($M = 1.39$, $SD = .77$), and because in this study negative and positive feedback were not orthogonal, this also meant that observers focused less on positive feedback compared with targets. The extent to which individuals focused on feedback also affected cooperative behavior, $B = .18$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.09, .27]. Participants' roles as targets or observers indirectly affected their willingness to cooperate through the extent to which they focused on feedback, 95% CI [.01, .14], consistent with Hypotheses 3a and 3b. However, inconsistent with the hypotheses, focusing more on bad feedback, and less on good feedback, led individuals to be *more* willing to cooperate with the instructor.[10] Thus, although observers did focus more on negative feedback compared with targets, this focus made observers more, rather than less, cooperative toward the instructor.

I also assessed the instructor's ratings of participants' improvement in the class as an additional measure of participants' cooperation with the instructor. I again used

---

[10] The results reported in the two mediation studies in Study 4 are the results found when not including control variables. However, these results remain consistent when controlling for the following variables: perceived usefulness of feedback, dancing experience, professional experience, trait agreeableness, actual positive and negative feedback received during class, class session, the intensity to which people focused on the feedback they heard or received, the interaction between this intensity and actual positive feedback, and the interaction between this intensity and actual negative feedback. Although professional lead roles were measured, there were not enough dancers who had lead roles in performances to use this as a control variable.

bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, 2009) to assess the mediation proposed in Hypotheses 3a and 3b. I first assessed the total effects model, which demonstrated a relationship between a person's role as a target (coded as 0) or an observer (coded as 1) and his or her improvement in the class, $B = 1.22$, $SE = .31$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.51, 1.73]. However, this relationship was again in the opposite direction predicted by Hypothesis 2; observers improved more ($M = 5.29$, $SD = 1.58$) than targets ($M = 4.17$, $SD = 1.86$) in the class, suggesting that they were more willing to cooperate with the instructor.[11] While this finding demonstrates a similar pattern compared with the self-report measure above, it is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2. As demonstrated in the previous mediation model, being a target (coded as 0) or an observer (coded as 1) affected the extent to which participants focused on negative feedback such that observers focused more on negative feedback ($M = 1.74$, $SD = 1.08$), and less on positive feedback, compared with targets ($M = 1.39$, $SD = .77$), $B = .35$, $SE = .17$, $p = .045$, 95% [.01, .68]. Again, the extent to which individuals focused on feedback affected cooperative behavior, $B = .57$, $SE = .16$, $p < .001$, 95% [.26, .89]. Participants' roles as targets or observers also indirectly affected their willingness to cooperate through the extent to which they focused on feedback, 95% CI [.01, .46], consistent with Hypotheses 3a and 3b. But, as with the self-report of participants' willingness to cooperate with the instructor, the direction of the effects in the model was inconsistent with the theory proposed; greater focus on negative feedback

---

[11] Note that when including those who complained and who missed two or more surveys, there was still a main effect of a person's role as target or observer on their improvement in the class (as rated by the instructor), $B = 1.42$, $SE = .29$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.86, 1.99]. However, there was no relationship between a person's role as target or observer and their focus on negative feedback, $B = .05$, $SE = .18$, $p = .789$, 95% CI [-.30, .40], and the indirect effect crossed zero, 95% CI [-.07, .14], suggesting that no mediation effect occurred.

made participants more willing to cooperate with the instructor.

Consistent with Studies 1 and 3, Study 4 demonstrated support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b that observers focus more on bad events, and less on good events, as compared with targets. Thus, this study suggests that even in a complex setting, observers perceive the situation more negatively than do targets, demonstrating the robustness of this effect. Furthermore, this research demonstrated that a person's role as a target or an observer in a given situation indirectly affects cooperative behavior through the person's perceptions, demonstrating that perceptions affect behavior. However, unlike Studies 2 and 3, which supported the notion that a greater focus on bad events, and a lesser focus on good events, hindered cooperative behavior, this study demonstrated that focusing on the negative encourages students to be more, rather than less, willing to cooperate with the instructor.

The results of Study 4 are unexpected and puzzling: Why would a person's role as a target or an observer result in an increased focus on negative feedback, but then also increased cooperation? Although data from Study 4 cannot directly address this question, some insight can be offered. As described above, the extent to which a dancer is anxious about the next class session was measured in each survey. When this variable was included in the mediation analysis as a dependent variable, the extent to which individuals focused on positive and negative feedback appeared to mediate the relationship between a person's role as a target or an observer and his or her anxiety for the next class, 95% CI [.03, .73]: Observers focused more on negative feedback, and consequently, had increased anxiety in the next class. Based on this result, it may be that as new students in the program, dancers are unsure of what to expect from the instructor, thus when observers hear feedback directed toward others, they immediately assume the

worst, which makes them become more anxious.

The relationship between observers' greater focus on negative feedback and anxiety is consistent with previous research on performers in general, which demonstrates that anxiety can be a response to negative performance feedback or reviews, particularly when it comes from an expert (e.g., peers, instructor, director). The type of anxiety that results from such negative feedback often inhibits performers' abilities (Helin, 1989; Liston, Frost & Mohr, 2003; Seta, Crisson, Seta, & Wang, 1989) and ultimately can have a negative impact on the dancer and his or her performance (Harris, 2013; Walker & Nordin-Bates, 2010). Such anxiety causes individuals to engage in behaviors that allow them to quickly escape the situation making them feel anxious (Marks & Neese, 1994). To overcome such anxiety, observers may have believed that the easiest way to "escape" or avoid similar treatment from the instructor was through cooperation, rather than responding in negative ways, which may increase conflict, and in turn participants' anxiety.

However, it is also a possibility that the type of anxiety observers experienced was more positive. Previous research has shown that certain types of anxiety can actually help enhance performance (e.g., Martens & Landers, 1970; Walker & Nordin-Bates, 2010). Although previous research would suggest that instructors often cause the type of anxiety that has negative effects on performers (e.g., Helin, 1989; Liston et al., 2003), there is the possibility that when reporting their level of anxiety for the next class session, dancers may have been reporting heightened levels of anxiety that are associated with improved performance and increased effort and motivation toward improving one's skills (Martens & Landers, 1970), which may also explain the results of Study 4.

Attempting to understand how dancers respond to anxiety brings up another issue and possible explanation for the alternative effects of Study 4 compared with the other studies conducted. That is, even though dancers recognized that they were receiving or overhearing negative performance feedback, did they actually perceive the feedback as a bad event? Some discussion from dance professionals would suggest that it depends on the type of negative feedback the instructor is giving. Negative feedback can be either constructive, in the sense that it is something that the dancer can actually improve with further work and proper instruction, or such feedback can be destructive, critiquing the individual rather than his or her skill and offering no solution for improvement in the future (Taylor, 1987). Although traditional teaching styles of ballet used the destructive form of negative feedback (Taylor, 1987), many instructors today are sensitive to dancers' feelings and self-confidence and instead choose to use constructive forms of negative feedback (Landau, 2013). The constructive and destructive forms of feedback mentioned above mirror challenge and hindrance stressors, respectively. Challenge stressors are stressors that are perceived to promote achievement or personal growth and ultimately improve a person's effort and performance (Le Pine, Podsakoff, & LePine, 2005). Thus, even though they are negative, they motivate individuals and often result in heightened performance. Hindrance stressors threaten personal growth and result in withdrawal and coping behaviors (LePine et al., 2005). The pattern of results in Study 4 suggests that dancers, although recognizing (and reporting) the feedback from the study as negative, may have perceived such negative information as a source of motivation in the situation, responding in a manner that suggests that the dancers perceived the negative feedback as a challenge stressor (LePine et al., 2005).

Another possible explanation is that there is a difference between performance feedback and the allocation of money, the latter being the focus in Studies 2 and 3. Indeed, negative performance feedback offers individuals an opportunity to increase their persistence on the task at hand to demonstrate their true capabilities and the accuracy of feedback (Sommer & Baumeister, 2002; Trope & Ben-Yair, 1982). In contrast, there is no opportunity in the dictator game to improve the allocation received through persistence or engagement in other behaviors. Thus, an important moderator in the link between a person's perceptions of the valence and subsequent cooperative behavior may be whether the person actually believes that cooperative behavior can improve the situation. Further discussion of these findings is presented in the general discussion.

Study 5: Perspective Taking as a Way to Attenuate Observers' Negative Perceptions

The studies thus far have demonstrated that observers focus more on bad events in situations compared with targets. And, as Studies 2 and 3 have suggested, in many cases observers' focus appears to discourage them from engaging in cooperative behavior in competitive situations such as distributions in which one person's gain appears to be another person's loss. Because organizations are often competitive contexts, it seems that it is important for organizations to encourage observers to have positive perceptions of the situations they observe, which may result in positive, or cooperative, behavior. Such behavior in the organization may also benefit observers personally, as it can improve the interpersonal relationships and outcomes that they experience (De Dreu, 2010; Smith et al., 1995). Because targets have more positive perceptions of the situation compared with

observers, observers may gain a more positive perspective, and engage in cooperative behavior, when they develop perceptions similar to targets' perceptions. Such a change in perception can be encouraged through perspective taking (e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Grant & Berry, 2011; Parker & Axtell, 2001). As observers recognize a target's point of view, it may help them shift focus from the bad events in the situation to the good events, much like a target's perception. Consistent with this logic, and Proposition 4, I hypothesize the following:

> ***Hypothesis 4a****: Observers who take a target's perspective focus less on bad events in the situation than observers who do not take a target's perspective.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 4b****: Observers who take a target's perspective focus more on good events in the situation than observers who do not take a target's perspective.*

Method

Participants. One-hundred and fifty-two undergraduate students (53 women) at the University of Utah participated in this study for partial course credit. The average age of participants was 23 years old; 66% of participants identified as White, 24% as Asian, 3% as Latino/Hispanic, and 7% identified as other.

Design and procedure. Study 5 had a 2 (target, observer) X 2 (perspective taking, control) design. Including targets in the study design created a comparison group for the observer condition and also allowed for further exploratory research related to Proposition 4.

The study procedures generally followed those of Study 2, except this study was conducted in a traditional laboratory setting with a university student sample. Upon

agreeing to participate in the study, participants were informed that they would be playing a dictator game with another participant and the experimenter on the computer. Participants were instructed how to play the dictator game and were told that they could be assigned the role of the allocator, target (i.e., recipient), or observer in the game. In reality, the experimenter was assigned to play the role of allocator, leaving participants to be assigned to either the target or the observer role. Participants were assigned a role and told that their role could change before any round, but that the three individuals in their group would not change during the entire study.

Next, participants saw the instructions for the dictator game. In addition to their assigned role of target or observer, participants were randomly assigned to perspective taking or control conditions. Participants in the control condition saw the instructions for the dictator game, as in Study 2. Participants in the perspective taking condition saw the dictator game instructions and a manipulation of perspective taking adapted from Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, and White (2008). Observers (targets) read the following:

> *As you learn of the (your) outcome in this game, take the perspective of the student who is the recipient (observer) in this round. Try to understand what he or she is thinking in this situation. Try to visualize yourself in that role, thinking as the recipient (observer).*

After four rounds of the game, participants were asked to answer questions regarding the rounds that they had been focusing on using the focusing illusion measure described in Study 3 (Loewenstein & Fredrick, 1997; Shakade & Kahneman, 1998), a manipulation check and demographics, and were allowed to exit the study.

Measures

I collected several measures to assess participants' focus, individual differences, and whether the manipulation of role worked in the study. I used the focusing illusion measure described in Study 3 (Loewenstein & Fredrick, 1997; Shakade & Kahneman, 1998) to measure focus, which was the dependent variable. Participants also answered demographic questions regarding age, gender, race, and education. I measured trait-based empathy (Davis, 1980) to use as a control in the model, as previous research has recognized the similarities between perspective-taking and empathy (e.g., Davis, 1980), which may result in any observed effects of perspective taking being explained by a person's empathetic concern. Finally, participants answered two manipulation checks. First, participants answered a question related to which role they were assigned during the game; allocator, target recipient, or observer. Second, participants answered two questions regarding perspective taking, "I tried to understand the other participant better by imagining how things looked from his or her perspective," and "I tried to put myself in the other participant's shoes" on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal) scale.

Results and Discussion

I began by conducting two analyses to ensure that the manipulations worked as intended. First, I assessed the effectiveness of the role manipulation by running a multinominal regression analysis using participants' assigned condition as the independent variable, and their reported role as the dependent variable. The results of this analysis suggested that the role manipulation worked, $\chi^2 = 128.50$, $p < .001$. Specifically, participants who were assigned to the target condition reported that they were the target

recipient in the game 92% of the time, and those assigned to the observer condition reported that they were the observer of the game 91% of the time. Second, to assess the perspective taking manipulation I combined the two items assessing the effectiveness of the perspective taking manipulation to create a measure of perspective taking, $r(152) = .36$, $p < .001$. I conducted a one-way ANOVA using participants' perspective taking condition as the independent variable and the two-item measure representing perspective taking as the dependent variable to ensure that the perspective taking manipulation worked as intended. The analysis showed that the perspective taking manipulation worked; those who read the perspective taking manipulation reported engaging in more perspective taking than those in the control group, $F(1, 151) = 6.47$, $p = .012$.

To assess Hypotheses 4a and 4b, I conducted a 2 X 2 ANOVA examining the interaction between a person's role as target (coded as 0) or observer (coded as 1) and engagement in perspective taking (0 = control, 1 = perspective taking) on the extent to which the person focused on good and bad events. I first examined Hypothesis 4a, which focuses on bad events. Although no main effect emerged for a person's role as target versus observer, $F(1, 152) = .71$, $p = .400$, $\eta^2 = .01$, or for perspective taking, $F(1, 152) = .07$, $p = .911$, $\eta^2 = 0$, an interaction did emerge between a person's role and perspective taking on the extent to which they focused on bad events, $F(1, 152) = 4.26$, $p = .041$, $\eta^2 = .03$. Specifically, in the control condition, observers focused on the bad events in the situation ($M = 6.10$, $SD = 2.22$) more than targets did, ($M = 4.97$, $SD = 2.11$), while in the perspective taking condition, there were no differences between targets ($M = 5.73$, $SD = 2.42$) and observers ($M = 5.26$, $SD = 2.72$) in the extent to which they focused on the bad

events in the situation (see Figure 5). [12]

I next assessed Hypothesis 4b using the same 2 X 2 ANOVA. Again, no main effects emerged for a person's role as a target or an observer, $F(1, 152) = .73$, $p = .394$, $\eta^2 = .01$, or for perspective taking, $F(1, 152) = .06$, $p = .803$, $\eta^2 = 0$. Furthermore, inconsistent with Hypothesis 4b, there was no effect of the interaction between a person's role in the situation and perspective taking on the extent to which the person focused on good events, $F(1, 152) = .1$, $p = .935$, $\eta^2 = 0$: Targets ($M = 6.42$, $SD = 2.58$) and observers ($M = 6.79$, $SD = 2.43$) focused about equally on good events in the control condition, and in the perspective taking condition, both targets ($M = 6.36$, $SD = 1.89$) and observers ($M = 6.65$, $SD = 2.39$) also focused about the same on good events. Thus Hypothesis 4b was not supported (see Figure 6).

The above results offer support for Proposition 4, but only in terms of the extent to which individuals focused on bad events. Specifically, taking the target's perspective helped observers focus less on bad events, supporting Hypothesis 4a, but no support was found for Hypothesis 4b, that taking the target's perspective would affect the extent to which observers focused on good events in a situation. Likewise, perspective taking changed the extent to which targets focused on bad events, but had no effect on the extent to which targets focused on good events. Such results suggest that perspective taking can change a person's perceptions of the valence of a situation, but this effect may be driven by how much a person focuses on the bad events in the situation.

Lack of support for Hypothesis 4b may be due to a ceiling effect in participants' ratings of the extent to which they focused on good events. In looking at Figures 5 and 6,

---

[12] When controlling for empathy, the effects reported in Study 5 remained consistent.



Figure 5: *Extent to which participants focused on bad events in the situation, moderated by perspective taking, Study 5.*



Figure 6: *Extent to which participants focused on good events in the situation, moderated by perspective taking, Study 5.*

it seems that participants in every condition focused more on good events than they did on bad events. This is in contrast to Hypotheses 1a and 1b and the findings in Study 1, which suggest that individuals focus more on negative events in the situation than positive events. One reason this pattern may have emerged that is consistent with the theory proposed in Chapter 1 is that the sample in Study 5, undergraduate students, is different than in previous studies. When such participants entered the study, they were assigned to work with another student and the experimenter. This group was necessary to ensure that the experimenter created an ambivalent situation, but also could have made the participant's membership as a student in the group more salient, as it highlighted the participant's in-group (i.e., the other student) and out-group (i.e., the experimenter). The theory presented in Chapter 1 suggests that when group membership is salient, individuals will be motivated to focus more on positive events in the situation over negative events, particularly when they perceive the out-group as positive. It is likely that, because participants were not familiar with the structure of participation in laboratory studies at this university at the time of the study, many participants perceived working with an experimenter as positive as it could help them gain credit for the study. This suggests that social motivations may be made salient in other ways besides being a target in the situation. Thus, group salience may have been heightened for all participants, not just targets, resulting in a greater focus on positive events.

Role Effects on Perceived Valence of a Situation and Cooperative Responses: A Meta-Analysis

In the above five studies, I assessed the effects of a person's role as a target or observer on his or her perceived valence of the situation and subsequent cooperative responses. The results of these studies suggest that targets adopt more negative perceptions of a situation compared with observers. However, two things remain unclear: First, it is unclear whether observers' negative perceptions are a result of one's focus on good events, bad events, or both. Second, it remains unclear whether observers are more or less willing than targets to cooperate in a situation. Given these issues, I conducted meta-analyses across the studies conducted above to assess the relationships between a person's role and his or her focus on good and bad events and willingness to cooperate with others.

In the first meta-analysis, I estimated the effect size between individuals' roles as targets or observers and their focus on bad events across all studies assessing this relationship (i.e., Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5). The results of the meta-analysis demonstrated a small to moderate effect (Cohen, 1992), d = -.29, se = .09, 95% CI [-.47, -.11].[13] The direction of the effect suggests that targets focus less on bad events in a situation than observers do, offering further support for Hypothesis 1a (see Table 2). I used these same studies to conduct a second meta-analysis estimating the effect size between individuals' roles as targets or observers and their focus on good events. Consistent with the findings

[13] Note that random effects models were used to for all assessments of effect sizes for several reasons, including that the small samples and different study procedures used in each study allow for greater possibility that there may be differences in effect sizes across studies and that the goal of the meta-analysis was to further assess generalizability of the hypothesized effects (Hedges & Vevea, 1998).

Table 2: Meta-Analytic Summary of Effect Sizes of a Person's Role as Target or Observer on Focus on Bad Events Across Experiments.

Study	N by Condition (Target, Observer)	Means (Target, Observer)	t	Weight	d	SE of d	CI around d
Bad Events							
Study 1	70 60	4.71 5.01	-1.74	33.3	-0.31	0.35	[-.65, .04]
Study 3	77 82	9.13 9.98	-2.28	40	-0.36	0.32	[-.68, -.04]
Study 4	70 65	1.61 1.66	-0.27	33.3	-0.05	0.34	[-.39, .29]
Study 5 (control condition only)	39 42	4.97 6.1	-2.32	19.2	-0.52	0.45	[-.97, -.07]
Fixed Effect Estimation					-0.29	0.09	[-.46, -.11]
Random Effect Estimation					-0.29	0.09	[-.47, -.11]

related to bad events, the results of the meta-analysis demonstrated a small to moderate effect (Cohen, 1992), d = .33, se = .10, 95% CI [.13, .52]. The direction of the effect suggests that targets focus more on good events than observers do and offers further support for Hypothesis 1b (see Table 3).

To assess the effect of individuals' roles on their cooperative behavior, I conducted meta-analyses assessing individuals' actual cooperative behavior, individuals' self-reported willingness to cooperate, and the combined effects of these measures. Results of the meta-analyses show small effects (Cohen, 1992) for actual cooperative behavior, d = .09, se = .92, 95% CI [-1.72, 1.88], self-reported willingness to cooperate, d = .02, se = .12, 95% CI [-.21, .26], and individuals' overall cooperativeness, d = .06, se = 31, 95% CI [-.55, .67]. In all cases, the direction of the effect sizes suggest that targets

Table 3: Meta-Analytic Summary of Effect Sizes of a Person's Role as Target or Observer on Focus on Good Events Across Experiments.

Study	N by Condition (Target, Observer)	Means (Target, Observer)	t	Weight	d	SE of d	CI around d
Good Events							
Study 1	70 60	4.21 3.63	2.14	33.3	0.38	0.35	[.02, .72]
Study 3	77 82	4.19 2.74	2.91	38.5	0.46	0.32	[.14, .78]
Study 4	70 65	2.39 2.34	0.27	33.3	0.05	0.34	[-.39, .29]
Study 5 (control condition only)	39 42	6.42 6.79	-0.65	19.6	-0.15	0.44	[-.59, .29]
Fixed Effect Estimation					0.33	0.09	[.15, .50]
Random Effect Estimation					0.33	0.1	[.13, .52]

were more cooperative than observers, consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, because all confidence intervals crossed zero, it cannot be concluded that targets were actually more cooperative than observers toward those who initiated the situation (see Table 4).

Table 4: Meta-Analytic Summary of Effect Sizes of a Person's Role as Target or Observer on Focus on Cooperation.

Study	N by Condition (Target, Observer)	Means (Target, Observer)	t	Weight	d	SE of d	CI around d
Cooperation (behavioral measures)							
Study 2	176 174	0.54 0.44	2.33	76.9	1	0.22	[.77, 1.22]
Study 4 (instructor ratings)	71 66	4.05 5.47	-4.86	31.3	-0.84	0.35	[-1.19, -.49]
Fixed Effect Estimation					0.47	0.1	[.28, .66]
Random Effect Estimation					0.09	0.92	[-1.72, 1.88]
Cooperation (self-reported measures)							
Study 2	122 123	4.18 4.32	-1.03	62.5	-0.13	0.25	[-.38, .12]
Study 3	77 82	2.71 2.37	1.62	38.5	0.26	0.31	[-.05, .58]
Study 4	69 63	6.59 6.6	-1.87	33.3	-0.02	0.34	[-.36, .32]
Fixed Effect Estimation					0.01	0.09	[-.16, .18]
Random Effect Estimation					0.02	0.12	[-.21, .26]
Cooperation (combined)							
Fixed Effect Estimation					0.21	0.06	[.09, .34]
Random Effect Estimation					0.06	0.31	[-.55, .67]

CHAPTER 3

GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The primary goal of this dissertation was to extend the research on how targets' and observers' perceptions differ by examining differences in perceptions of the valence of a situation. The primary proposition was that observers perceive the situation as more negative than do targets. Across four studies that examined ambivalent situations in contexts related to organizational settings, support for this proposition was found. Study 1 showed that observers had more negative perceptions of work experiences compared with targets, as they brought up fewer good events, and slightly more bad events, in the situations they described. In Study 3, a multiround bargaining game, observers focused more on bad events, and less on good events, compared with targets (i.e., recipients). Study 4 demonstrated that ballet dancers who observed the feedback that others received perceived more feedback to be negative than did the targets of the feedback, demonstrating that observers' perceptions are more negative than targets' perceptions even in complex situations. Finally, Study 5 demonstrated that taking the target's perspective attenuates observers' negative perceptions by making their focus more similar to targets' focus on bad events. Across the studies, whether observers' negative perceptions were due to their increased focus on bad events or their decreased focus on good events varied. However, two meta-analyses support the idea that observers'

perceptions are more negative by demonstrating that observers focused more on bad events and less on good events compared with targets.

A second set of propositions in this research was that observers, compared with targets, have more negative responses to a situation as a result of their more negative perceptions. Cooperation toward the initiator of the situation was focused on as a response, as it has important implications for group performance (Beersma et al., 2003) and employee satisfaction (Smith et al., 1995). Study 2 showed that observers in ambivalent situations were less willing to cooperate with an allocator in a dictator game compared with targets. Study 3 demonstrated that this lack of cooperation from observers was a result of their negative perceptions of the situation. Although Study 4, which tested the mediation hypothesis in a sample of ballet dancers, also demonstrated that a person's perceptions affected his or her willingness to cooperate with the instructor, this study showed that negative perceptions resulted in dancers being more, rather than less, willing to cooperate with the instructor, as predicted by Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Reflecting these conflicting results, a meta-analysis further supported the idea that there is not a clear consistent relationship between a person's role and his or her cooperative response. Why this behavior may have occurred is discussed in the *Limitations* section.

Theoretical Contributions

Extending the list of how individuals' perceptions of a situation vary to include valence is the biggest theoretical contribution of this research. Although previous work has recognized that individuals tend to focus on bad events in a situation more than good (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzmann, 2001), research has generally ignored the

situational factors that may affect the extent to which individuals focus on bad events over good events. Drawing from previous work on targets' and observers' unique perceptions (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1972), the current research argued that observers have more negative perceptions of a situation compared with targets. By offering support for this argument in contexts that share features with many organizational settings, this research makes contributions to both social psychology and management literatures. The specific contributions made to three bodies of literature—differences in self and other experiences, biases toward negative perceptions, and factors affecting cooperative behavior—are discussed below.

Self versus Other Experiences

Targets and observers have different perceptions of a situation (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Trope & Liberman, 2010). However, this argument is limited to how targets' and observers' perceptions vary in the amount of detail they recognize. By limiting the research to this single dimension of how targets' and observers' perceptions differ, the differences between targets' and observers' perceptions of the valence of a situation have been overlooked. But because situational differences can affect a person's perceptions of the valence of a situation (De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006), it seems likely that there is a difference between targets' and observers' perceptions of a situation's valence. The current research thus contributes to the literature on the self versus other experience by identifying an additional way in which the perceptions of those who experience a situation themselves systematically differ from those who experience the situation

through others.

Differences in perceptions of a situation's valence offer an additional explanation for many phenomena partially explained by the distinction between how much detail targets and observers recognize. Individuals' tendencies to stereotype, attribute others' behaviors to personal characteristics yet their own behavior to situational factors, and judge others more harshly than themselves have all been attributed to differences in the amount of detail individuals recognize in the situation (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008; Gilbert, 1998; Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Kelley, 1973; Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 2003). Demonstrating that observers have more negative perceptions of a situation than targets do can provide an additional explanation for these effects. For example, observers may judge those involved in a situation more harshly than targets do because they recognize less detail than targets do and/or because they perceive the situation as more negative than do targets. Other phenomena related to targets and observers that cannot be explained by differences in detail recognition can also be explained by differences in the perceptions of the valence of a situation. The self-serving bias, for example, which suggests that targets attribute good outcomes to their own behavior and bad outcomes to situational factors (Greenwald, 1980), cannot be explained by the amount of detail a person recognizes, but can be explained by the person's perceptions of a situation's valence. Specifically, the self-serving bias suggests that, consistent with the propositions outlined in Chapter 1, targets attempt to focus more on good events in the situation while minimizing bad events.

Moreover, a motivational explanation for why targets' and observers' perceptions vary was offered, arguing that the salience of targets' and observers' motivations are

different in a given situation. Although these motivations are not empirically tested in this research, they offer one explanation as to why a target may perceive a situation as more positive, and less negative, compared with an observer. This explanation also introduced one way in which observers' perceptions can become more positive—through taking the perspective of a target. Perspective takers can better understand the underlying motivations of those whose perspectives they take (Davis, 1983), which arguably helps make observers' perceptions more similar to targets' perceptions. Indeed, the observers in Study 5 who adopted the target's perspective had a more positive perception of the situation than observers who did not take the target's perspective. Arguably, the reason why observers who adopted the target's perspective had a similarly valenced perception as targets did is because they also adopted the motivations of targets.

The Bias Toward Negative Perceptions

This is also the first research to argue that there are differences in individuals' biases toward the negative events in a situation. It has been assumed previously that most individuals have a tendency to focus more on bad events than good events in the situation (Baumeister et al., 2001). The current research, however, argues that although all individuals may focus to some extent on bad events, observers focus more on bad events and less on good events than targets do. Such patterns are consistent when good and bad events are considered orthogonal (Studies 1, 3, 5) or when good and bad events are considered opposite ends of a single spectrum (Study 4). Thus, a situational role (being an observer) appears to intensify what is commonly referred to as the negativity bias (Baumeister et al., 2001). Such an explanation offers a greater understanding regarding

when individuals may have positive or negative perceptions of a situation by suggesting one factor that influences individuals' focus on negative and positive events.

Role Differences and Cooperative Behavior

The current research also contributes to the management literature in two ways. First, this work recognizes the importance of situational roles in groups such as the organization. Formal roles are an important aspect of effective group and organizational functioning (e.g., Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). But informal roles are also important, as such roles affect individual and group performance (Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009). Furthermore, the temporary informal roles that a person adopts in a situation, specifically being a target or an observer, appear to affect a person's subsequent responses toward those involved in the situation. Noting the importance of temporary roles that may change multiple times throughout a day demonstrates how such roles affect individuals' perceptions and behaviors, highlighting the important part these roles may have in daily social interactions, including interactions in the workplace.

Second, one reason individuals' cooperative behavior may vary across situations is articulated in this research. Both targets and observers respond to others' actions through cooperative behavior (e.g., Boles et al., 2000; Spencer & Rupp, 2009; Turillo et al., 2002). However, the possibility that role differences promote differences in cooperative behavior has generally been ignored in previous research. Despite this, differences in perceptions across these roles have been acknowledged (Ross & Nisbett, 1991), and other situational factors have been shown to affect cooperative behavior (De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006). The current work

demonstrates that observers, compared with targets, are less willing to engage in cooperative behavior with those who initiate the situation. Thus, this work illuminates the differences between targets' and observers' cooperative behavior, supporting the idea that a small situational difference can drastically change individuals' willingness to cooperate with others.

The context of ambivalent situations created in each study also has important theoretical implications. The studies presented here asked participants to recall or experience ambivalent situations through recall tasks, allocation games, trust-based scenarios, and performance feedback. Ambivalent situations appear to be common to the organizational setting, which allowed this research to demonstrate that the roles of target and observer may affect employee perceptions and behaviors. Ambivalent situations also presented an unclear valence of the situation. This context was key to isolating the effects of a person's role on his or her perceptions of a situation's valence from the effects of the valence of the situation itself. Indeed, when purely good or bad situations occur, individuals allow the situation's valence to affect their perceptions of the situation's valence (Weiner, 1985). Thus if targets' and observers' perceptions in a purely good or purely bad situation were compared, they would likely show little difference. The use of such contexts in previous research may be a reason the distinction between targets' and observers' perceptions of the situation's valence were previously overlooked. By creating several different ambivalent situations, the robustness of targets' and observers' different perceptions in a given situation was demonstrated.

Limitations and Future Directions

Despite its theoretical contributions, this research has several limitations. The biggest limitations are the inconsistencies found in the empirical results across the five studies conducted. How the roles of target and observer, and subsequent perceptions, affected cooperative behavior led to the most inconsistent results. And although it seems that observers' more negative perceptions, relative to targets' perceptions, were due to the extent to which they focused on both good and bad events, there are limitations in some studies that could alternatively explain differences in focus on good or bad events across studies. Such limitations are addressed below.

Inconsistent Results in Focus Across Studies

Across all the studies that examined perceptions, observers had more negative perceptions than targets, but whether such perceptions were the result of observers focusing more on bad events or less on good events was inconsistent across studies. Consistent with the negativity bias, which suggests that all individuals focus to some extent on bad events and may vary more in the extent to which they attend to good events (Rozin & Royzman, 2001), Study 1 demonstrated that observers focused on good events in a situation less than targets did. But, in contrast to this finding, Study 5 demonstrated that targets and observers only differed in the extent to which they focused on bad events in the situation. Furthermore, Study 3 demonstrated that targets and observers varied in the extent to which they focused on good *and* bad events in the situation. And by changing the measurement used to assess individuals' focus on good and bad events, Study 4 demonstrated that observers focused more on bad events, or less on good events,

in the situation. Two meta-analyses suggested that this was simply due to variation across studies and that observers' and targets' perceptions were a result of their focus on both good and bad events. However, there are other possible explanations for why such variability occurred.

The observed differences in participants' patterns of focus on good and bad events in Study 1 compared with the other studies may be attributed to the temporal nature of Study 1. When a person recalls a situation, he or she tends to focus more on positive than negative aspects of the situation, particularly when the situation personally affected the individual (Taylor, 1991). Because Study 1 used a recall task, it may be that the discrepancy between targets' and observers' discussion of good events in the situation was magnified relative to the other studies conducted. Another possibility, as discussed in Study 5, is that the sample used in Study 5 compared with the other studies may have affected the pattern of results. Specifically, a ceiling effect may have occurred in Study 5, which resulted in no variation between targets' and observers' focus on good events in the situation. Because of this effect, it is unclear how good events may have factored into observers' perceptions relative to targets' perceptions. Whether or not these factors actually affect what targets and observers focus on in a situation offers an opportunity to explore moderators beyond perspective taking that may affect the variation in targets' and observers' perceptions.

Inconsistent Results in Cooperation Across Studies

The biggest inconsistencies across studies were with regard to the types of behavior that resulted from individuals' roles. In Study 2, observers actually engaged in

less cooperative behavior than targets, but reported that they would engage in similar cooperative behavior as targets. In Study 3, observers reported that they had more negative perceptions and, as a consequence, would be less willing to cooperate with the situation's initiator compared with targets. In contrast, observers also had negative perceptions in Study 4, but such perceptions led to *more* cooperative behavior. A meta-analysis assessing the effect size of individuals' roles on their cooperative behavior suggested that other factors related to each specific study may explain the observed differences across studies. Outlined next are some of the possible explanations for why these inconsistencies may have occurred.

At the end of Study 4, one possibility suggested was that performance feedback and allocations as outcomes are fundamentally different experiences and result in different behavioral outcomes. In Studies 2 and 3, the allocation outcome represented a gain-only situation. Furthermore, in Study 2 the gain was only small, and in Study 3 any gain was hypothetical. In contrast, the instructor's feedback in Study 4 represented a large potential gain or loss for the participant; participants could receive more or less attention from the instructor or change their standing in the program depending on their responses to the feedback they received. Another difference is the nature of the relationships in the allocation games compared with the ballet class. In the allocation games, participants did not have an interpersonal relationship with one another and knew that they would interact with those in their group for a short time. In contrast, the dancers in the ballet study knew that they would have classes again with the instructor and that the instructor may eventually have influence over their career; thus the ongoing relationship that they would have with the instructor was likely salient and important to

dancers. The distinction between gains and losses, the reality of the outcomes, the outcome size, and the relationship between those involved in the situation may all affect how individuals behave in a given situation (Fischer et al., 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). Thus, one or all of these factors could have affected the relationship between how an individual perceived the situation and his or her subsequent response. Participants in Study 4, for example, may have considered their behavior much more carefully in response to the good or bad situations they encountered, as the consequences of such responses were real and not part of a game. This may have led participants to engage in different behaviors than they otherwise would, resulting in behavioral patterns that were opposite of those found in Studies 2 and 3.

Many of the explanations discussed above—greater consequences, the possibility of losses as a result of an individual's behavior, and ongoing and influential relationships—suggest that the performance feedback context from Study 4 may be more consistent with an organizational setting than the allocation context. For example, individuals in organizational settings often recognize that their behavior could impact their future in the organization or affect their relationship with another person. Despite such similarities, major differences between these contexts also exist. One difference between organizations and ballet classes is the developmental nature of feedback in ballet classes. Indeed, ballet dancers are known to see any feedback—including bad feedback—as an indication that they have the potential for success (Bullock, 2015); such an assumption is not present in many organizational contexts. Thus, although ballet classes have many similarities to organizations in terms of the outcomes and relationships that

occur, how individuals perceive the positive and negative feedback that they receive may not be among such similarities.

Another possible reason for the inconsistent results in Study 4 compared with the other studies has to do with the design of Study 4. Although in Study 4 participants were assigned to be either targets or observers, all participants received feedback during each class session. The instructor was purposely blind to each participant's condition to ensure that no one taking the class received more or less attention than anyone else in the class. Because the distinction between targets and observers was less clear in Study 4 compared with the experimental studies, it may have affected participants' behavioral responses to feedback that they experienced or observed.

Inconsistent Results Across Cooperation Measures

A related inconsistency across studies was regarding the results found between the actual and self-reported cooperation measures in Study 2 and the self-reported cooperation measures in Studies 2 and 3. In Study 2, observers actually cooperated less with the initiator of the situation than targets did, but their self-reports of cooperative behavior suggested that targets and observers were similarly willing to cooperate. In Study 3, observers reported that they felt less cooperative than targets through their greater focus on bad events. Although the results of the self-reported measure of individuals' willingness to cooperate in Study 2 seem inconsistent with the results of the behavioral measure in Study 2 and the self-reported measure in Study 3, the nature of the study designs may offer insight into how the different results of these studies can be reconciled. In Study 2, participants engaged in a multiple round dictator game in which

they received or saw allocations made by the allocator. Participants saw that in every round the allocator gave the target at least a small portion of money. In Study 3, participants saw that the allocator in the game gave all or none of the money to the recipient, which was a much clearer distinction between good and bad events. Because the ambivalent situation in Study 2 was subtler than in Study 3, it may have been more difficult for observers to recognize their noncooperative behavior. In other words, observers' cooperative behavior in Study 2 may have been suppressed compared with that of targets, resulting in observers reporting that their behavior was more cooperative than it actually was. In contrast, with the good and bad events clearly distinguished in Study 3, it may have been easier for observers to recognize their unwillingness to cooperate, which resulted in a difference in observers' and targets' self-reports of cooperation.

Furthermore, given the evidence presented in Chapter 1 that individuals are motivated to maintain a positive image in their own eyes and in the eyes of others (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988), it is possible that all individuals were attempting to preserve their positive image by rating themselves more willing than they actually were to cooperate. This motivation may have resulted in an inaccurate reflection of participants' actual willingness to cooperate. Indeed, previous research has acknowledged that individuals have a tendency to self-enhance when they are given the opportunity to report their own behavior (Arnold & Feldman, 1981; Holtgraves, 2004; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). If participants perceived that cooperation was desired during the studies, individuals across both conditions may have wanted to rate themselves favorably on this dimension, which would then result in no differences across conditions.

Future Research

Based on the above discussion, the most fruitful area for future research seems to be testing the boundary conditions of the proposed model. I have tested one boundary condition—perspective taking—and found that it attenuates the variation between targets' and observers' perceptions, encouraging less negative perceptions in observers. However, there are other moderators that potentially affect this relationship. One that has been suggested above is the temporal nature of the situation—whether the situation is occurring at the moment or has already occurred. Another potential moderator may include the types of relationships that the target, observer, and initiator of the situation have with one another. For example, if a target and observer are close friends, rather than casual acquaintances, there may be no differences between their perceptions because their own and the other person's motivations are already closely aligned.

The moderators of the relationship between individuals' perceptions of a situation's valence and their subsequent behavioral responses are also an important area for future research. One such moderator may be the context in which the situation is occurring. The hypotheses related to cooperation were supported in the allocation contexts outlined in Studies 2, 3, and 5, but not supported in the ballet context in Study 4. Such mixed results suggest that targets and observers may not respond in the same way across all situations they encounter in the organizational setting. While allocation games and ballet classes are very different, each context has some overlap with actual organizational settings. As discussed above, in both the ballet context and other organizational settings, individuals' behaviors can impact their future with the organization and can have lasting effects on future relationships with individuals. Yet, all

feedback in a ballet class offers the opportunity for growth, which may not be the case of all bad events in the situation. Thus, the ballet context seems to demonstrate what occurs in an organization that supports a learning culture, in which employees see failures as opportunities to learn and are motivated to engage in behavior that enhances their own performance (Murphy & Dweck, 2010). Organizations that promote learning cultures encourage individuals to learn from mistakes, rather than respond defensively (Murphy & Dweck, 2010; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008), and to seek out individuals who have a growth, rather than an incremental mindset (Chatman & Cha, 2003). Such a culture may reverse the hypothesized effect between negative perceptions and uncooperative behavior.

Allocation games appear to be one context in which the hypothesized relationships are supported. Such contexts also have similarities to organizational contexts. For example, in both contexts, many of the bad events that individuals experience do not offer opportunities for further development, much like the offers that occur in allocation games. The allocation context used in Studies 2, 3, and 5 offers insight into the pattern of behavior that might be observed in negotiations contexts in the organization since both parties enter the negotiation with the expectation that they will gain something over what they can achieve on their own (Thompson et al., 2010). Although both the allocation and ballet contexts have limitations in their ability to fully predict what might occur in the organizational setting, such limitations demonstrate the complexity of the organizational setting and offer insight into the boundary conditions of the relationship between the valence of perceptions and cooperative responses. Each of these contexts should be further explored in future research to better understand how

individuals respond to different types of good and bad events. Further, since these contexts do not account for many occurrences in the organizational setting, it would be useful to explore the patterns of behavior across targets and observers in other organizationally-related contexts such as hiring, working in teams, hierarchies, and organizations with different types of cultures.

Moving beyond cooperative behavior as a response also offers opportunities for future research. Indeed, the discussion supporting Proposition 2 suggested that targets and observers can respond in a variety of ways and that such responses can be directed at a larger group, others involved in the situation, or the situation's initiator. Future research could extend the findings of this research to several types of responses such as trust, retribution, commitment, and satisfaction. Furthermore, research could examine individuals' responses toward the larger group in which the situation occurs, offering further insight into how the roles of targets and observers affect group outcomes.

Finally, one of the major contributions of this work is that it demonstrates another way in which targets' and observers' perceptions vary beyond the amount of detail that they recognize in the situation. Understanding why individuals' perceptions vary in the proposed manner is important for future research. One potential explanation, focusing on the salience of individuals' motivations in a situation, was outlined in Chapter 1. Specifically, Chapter 1 proposed that one factor that is different between targets and observers is the salience of their self and social motivations, which in turn affects their perceptions differently. Understanding how such motivations are affected by situational roles, and affect individuals' perceptions, would offer insight into the differences between targets' and observers' perceptions. Furthermore, it is important for future work

to continue to expand the ways in which targets' and observers' perceptions vary and the underlying process, which will better illuminate why individuals behave differently when they experience the same situation.

Practical Implications

Individuals adopt temporary roles in multiple situations every day. These situations often occur within an organizational setting, as many individuals spend much of their day at work. Thus, there are several practical implications of this research for organizations to consider. Most important, organizations and individuals in organizations should recognize that situational roles can affect how individuals perceive and respond to situations. For example, in assigning tasks to his or her team, a project manager should be aware that while team members might easily comply with their assignments as the targets of the assignments, observers from another team may have negative responses to how the tasks were assigned. Such negative responses from observers may affect future cooperation across the teams. From this example, another implication of this research is that managers must consider how to include those who affect the final performance of the team. Indeed, including individuals in decision-making processes appears to result in positive outcomes for both individuals and the organization. This claim is consistent with work on job design, goal setting, and empowerment, which suggests that when individuals feel included in key aspects of the task or job, they experience positive outcomes such as higher satisfaction (Erez & Kanfer, 1983; Hackman & Lawler, 1971; Spreitzer, 1995; Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001).

The current research may also help organizations encourage more cooperation

among employees who are observers. Indeed, taking the perspective of the target appears to be an effective way to reduce the negative perceptions that observers have of a situation and has been previously implemented in the organizational setting (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Grant & Berry, 2011; Parker & Axtell, 2001). Thus, if organizations can recognize individuals' distinct roles, they can then encourage greater cooperation from observers through encouraging them to take the perspective of targets.

Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to understand better how targets' and observers' perceptions of the valence of a situation varies and how such perceptions affect subsequent cooperative behavior. This research demonstrated that 1) observers have more negative perceptions than targets do, 2) such perceptions affect subsequent cooperative responses toward the initiator of the situation, and 3) perspective taking can help attenuate an observer's negative perceptions of a situation. Although groups and organizations may not be able to always control a person's role as a target or an observer in a situation, knowing that this simple situational factor can affect an individual's perceptions and subsequent responses is important. At the very least, recognizing the implications of the role that individuals adopt in a situation may offer insight into why they perceive a situation so negatively and refuse to cooperate and how to change such negative perceptions and subsequent behaviors.

APPENDIX A

DICTATOR GAME – TARGET'S INSTRUCTIONS

You are about to participate in a silent negotiation in which there will be no communication. This negotiation will involve several rounds of "one-shot" offers. Specific details on this negotiation are provided on the next page.

(next page in survey)

In this part of the exercise, you will be playing the role of the "recipient" in an ultimatum bargaining game.[14]

To begin, the allocator, who is your partner in this game, will have the opportunity to allocate a pot of money between the two of you. As the recipient, you will not be given the opportunity to reject this offer; rather, you will have to accept whatever offer is made to you. However, at any point during the game, you may be reassigned to act as the allocator in the game, at which point you will be allowed to determine how much money you and your partner each receive.

The size of the pot in each round is: $ 1.50

To make an offer, the allocator will first need to indicate the amount of money he or she plans to offer you. The allocator can offer any amount between $0 and $ 1.50. You may receive the amount of money that is offered to you.

You are the only recipient in this game, however, other individuals will observe your game and the decisions made. Although there are other individuals involved in this game, they will never know your identity, as you will remain anonymous.

On the next page, you will see the first offer made to you by the allocator.

---

[14] One round of your game will be chosen for you to actually receive payment.

APPENDIX B

SUBJECTIVE VALUE INVENTORY ADAPTED MEASURE

1. What kind of overall impression did your counterpart make on you? (1 = extremely negative, 4 = neither negative nor positive, 7 = extremely positive)
2. Did the negotiation make you trust your counterpart? (1 = not at all, 4 = moderately, 7 = perfectly)
3. Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your counterpart? (1 = not at all, 4 = moderately, 7 = perfectly)
4. To what extent would you be willing to work with the allocator from rounds 1-4 of this game in a future exercise? (1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = to a great extent)

APPENDIX C

TRUST GAME – OBSERVER'S INSTRUCTIONS

In the exercise for this study, you will read about several rounds of a game between two players (Player A and Player B). Here is how each round works:

There is $6 at the start of each round. Player A will make
the first decision. Player A can choose to:
1) Take $6
2) Pass $6

If Player A chooses "Take $6", he/she will earn $6 and Player B will earn $0.

If Player A chooses "Pass $6", the amount of money grows to $18, and Player B decides how much of the $18 to return to Player A.

Player B can "Return $18", "Return $9", or "Return $0".

If Player B chooses "Return $18", Player A earns $18 and Player B earns $0.

If Player B chooses "Return $9", Player A earns $9 and Player B earns $9.

If Player B chooses "Return $0", Player A earns $0 and Player B earns $18.

In each round, both players are asked to indicate what they would do before they see the other person's decision. Note that the game may actually end earlier once Player A's choice is revealed, so Player B's choice may not influence the outcome of the game.

For example, if Player A chooses to "Take $6," then the choice of Player B is meaningless (as the game ends with Player A earning $6 and Player B earning $0). Only when Player A chooses to "Pass $6" will the choice of Player B matter. Still, in each round both Player A and Player B will record their decisions before the other player's decision is revealed.

—

At the end of the game you will prepare to play the same game you just observed. You will be asked to indicate whether or not you would like Player B to be your partner. Your

decision will not affect which role you are assigned to, rather after you make your decision you will be randomly assigned to act as Player A or Player B. You will then play the game as outlined previously.

You will now observe the decisions of the players across four rounds. Please keep track of the money each player earns during each round. You will be asked to report the total amount of money that each player earned later in the survey. This will be good practice for you, as you will have to keep track of the money you earn when you actually play the game.

In the first four rounds of the game, here are the decisions of the players:

Round 1:
Player A: Pass $6
Player B: Keep $18

Round 2:
Player A: Pass $6
Player B: Keep $18

Round 3:
Player A: Pass $6
Player B: Give $18

Round 4:
Player A: Pass $6
Player B: Give $18

APPENDIX D

COGNITIVE ELABORATION ADAPTED MEASURE

When thinking about the situation described above and those involved were you …
… Attempting to analyze the issues addressed by the situation
… Not very attentive to the situation
… Deep in thought about the situation
… Unconcerned with the suggestions given by the individual involved in the situation
… Distracted by other thoughts not related to the situation
… Reflecting on the implications of the situation

REFERENCES

Adam, H., & Shirako, A. (2013). Not all anger is created equal: The impact of the expresser's culture on the social effects of anger in negotiations. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 98*¸ 785–798.

Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 267–299). New York: Academic Press.

Ames, D. R., & Kammrath, L. K. (2015). When the dirt sticks: Negativity in secondhand impressions. *Working paper.*

Andersson, L. M., & Pearson, C. M. (1999). Tit for tat? The spiraling effect of incivility in the workplace. *Academy of Management Review, 24,* 452–471.

Anseel, F., Lievens, F., & Schollaert, E. (2009). Reflection as a strategy to enhance task performance after feedback. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 110*, 23–35.

Arnold, H. J., & Feldman, D. C. (1981). Social desirability response bias in self-report choice situations. *Academy of Management Journal, 24*(2), 377–385.

Associated Press (2014, October 20). Women's pay remark continues to dog Microsoft chief. Retrieved from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/women-s-pay-remark/1427002.html

Balcetis, E. & Dunning, D. (2010) Wishful seeing: Desired objects are seen as closer. *Psychological Science, 21*, 147–152.

Bandura, A. (1977). *Social learning theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Barrell, G. M., & Terry, P. C. (2003). Trait anxiety and coping strategies among ballet dancers. *Medical Problems of Performing Artists, 18*(2), 59–64.

Baston, C. D, Early, S., & Salvarani, G. (1997). Perspective taking: Imagining how another feels versus imagining how you would feel. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23*, 751–758.

Baumeister, R. F. (1984). Choking under pressure: Self-consciousness and paradoxical effects of incentives on skillful performance. *Journal of Personality and Social*

Psychology, 46(3), 610–620.

Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., pp. 680–740). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than good. *Review of General Psychology, 5*(4), 323–370.

Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1993). When ego threats lead to self-regulation failure: Negative consequences of high self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64*, 141–156.

Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J. R., & Moore, D. A. (2000). The death and rebirth of the social psychology of negotiation. In G. J. O. Fletcher and M. S. Clark (Eds). *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Interpersonal processes* (pp. 196–228). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.

Beersma, B., Hollenbeck, J. R., Conlon, D. E., Humphrey, S. E., Moon, H., & Ilgen, D. R. (2009). Cutthroat cooperation: The effects of team role decisions on adaption to alternative reward structures. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 108*, 131–142.

Beersma, B., Hollenbeck, J. R., Humphrey, S. E., Moon, H., Conlon, D. E., & Ilgen, D. R. (2003). Cooperation, competition, and team performance: Toward a contingency approach. *Academy of Management Journal, 46*(5), 572–590.

Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. *Games and Economic Behavior, 10*, 122–142.

Blackhart, G. C., Nelson, B. C., Knowles, M. L., & Baumeister, R. F. (2009). Rejection elicits emotional reactions but neither causes immediate distress nor lowers self esteem: A meta-analytic review of 192 studies on social exclusion. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13*(4), 269–309

Bogaert, S., Boone, C., & Declerck, C. (2008). Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A review and conceptual model. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 47*(3), 453–480.

Boles, T. L., Croson, R. T. A., & Murninghan, J. K. (2000). Deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83*(2), 235–259.

Bono, J. E., Glomb, T. M., Shen, W., Kim, E., & Koch, A. J. (2013). Building positive resources: Effects of positive events and positive reflection on work stress and health. *Academy of Management Journal, 56*(6), 1601–1627.

Bottom, W., Gibson, K., Daniels, S., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002). When talk is not cheap: Substantive penance and expressions of intent in the reestablishment of cooperation. *Organizational Science, 13,* 497–513.

Bowling, N. A., & Michel, J. S. (2011). Why do you treat me badly? The role of attributions regarding the cause of abuse in subordinates' responses to abusive supervision. *Work & Stress, 25*(4), 309–320.

Bracey, L. (2004). Voicing connections: An interpretive study of university dancers' experiences. *Research in Dance Education, 5*(1), 7–24.

Brief, A. P., Butcher, A. H., & Roberson, L. (1995). Cookies, disposition, and job attitudes: The effects of positive mood-inducing events and negative affectivity on job satisfaction in a field experiment. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62*(1), 55–62.

Brockner, J., Fishman, A. Y., Reb, J., Goldman, B., Spiegel, S., & Garden, C. (2007). Procedural fairness, outcome favorability, and judgments of an authority's responsibility. *Journal of Applied Psychology 92*(6), 1657–1671.

Brockner, J. Tyler, T. R., & Cooper- Schneider, R. (1992). The influence of prior commitment to an institution on reactions to perceived unfairness: The higher they are, the harder they fall. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 37*, 241–261.

Brown, G. D. A., Neath, I., & Chater, N. (2007). A temporal ratio model of memory. *Psychological Review, 114*(3), 539–576.

Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new source of inexpensive, yet high quality, data? *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6*, 3–5.

Bullock, K. (2015, January 30). Corrections are good: How to take critique like a dancer. Retrieved from http://writerunboxed.com/2015/01/30/corrections-are-good-how-to-take-critique-like-a-dancer/

Burrows, P. (2014, October 10). What women in the room say about Microsoft CEO's Weird Advice. *Bloomberg News*. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-10/the-reaction-inside-the-women-s-conference-to-microsoft-ceo-nadella-s-gaffe-.html

Cacioppo, J. T., & Berntson, G. G. (1994). Relationship between attitudes and evaluative space: A critical review, with emphasis on the separability of positive and negative substrates. *Psychological Bulletin*, *115*(3), 401–423.

Carnevale, P. J. D., & Isen, A. M. (1986). The influence of positive affect and visual

access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37*, 1–13.

Chatman, J. A., & Cha, S. E. (2003). Leading by leveraging culture. *California Management Review, 45*(4), 20–34.

Chowdhry, A. (2014, October 10). Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella apologizes for comments on women's pay. *Forbes*. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/amitchowdhry/2014/10/10/microsoft-ceo-satya-nadella-apologizes-for-comments-on-womens-pay/

Chua, R. Y. J. (2013). The costs of ambient cultural disharmony: Indirect intercultural conflicts in social environment undermine creativity. *Academy of Management Journal, 56*(6), 1545–1577.

Clark, M. S., & Reis, H. T. (1988). Interpersonal processes in close relationships. *Annual Review of Psychology, 39*, 609–672.

Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. *Psychological Bulletin, 112*, 155–159.

Cohen-Charash, Y. (2009). Episodic envy. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 39*, 2128–2173.

Cohen-Charash, Y., & Mueller, J. S. (2007). Does perceived unfairness exacerbate or mitigate interpersonal counterproductive work behaviors related to envy? *Journal of Applied Psychology, 92*(3), 666–680.

Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1985). *The NEO Personality Inventory.* Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.

Crocker, J., & Canevello, A. (2008). Creating and undermining social support in communal relationships: The role of compassionate and self-image goals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95*(3), 555–575.

Crocker, J., & Major, B. (1989). Social stigma and self-esteem: The protective properties of stigma. *Psychological Review, 96*(4), 608–630.

Croson, R., Boles, T., & Murninghan, J. K. (2003). Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: Lying and threats in ultimatum games. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51*, 143–159.

Cugueró-Escofet, N. Fortin, M., & Canela, M. A. (2013). Righting the wrong for third parties: how monetary compensation, procedure changes, and apologies can restore justice for observers of injustice. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *122*(2), 253–268. doi:10.1007/s10551- 013-1762-7.

Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Xu, H. (2006). What do people value when they negotiate? Mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91*(3), 493–512.

Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8,* 377–383.

Davelaar, E. J., Goshen-Gottstein, Y., Ashkenazi, A., Haarmann, H. J., & Usher, M. (2005). The demise of short-term memory revisited: Empirical and computational investigations of recency effects. *Psychological Review, 112,* 3–42.

Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. *JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10*, 85.

Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44*(1), 113–126.

Davis, M. H., Conklin, L., Smith, A., & Luce, C. (1996). Effect of perspective taking on the cognitive representation of persons: A merging of self and other. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70*, 713–726.

De Cremer, D., & van Knippenberg, D. (2002). How do leaders promote cooperation? The effects of charisma and procedural fairness. *Journal of Applied Psychology 87*(5), 858–866

De Dreu, C. K. W. (2010). Social conflict: The emergence and consequences of struggle and negotiation. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 983–1023). New York, NY: Wiley.

De Dreu, C. K. W., & Weingart, L. R. (2003). Task versus relationship conflict, team performance, and team member satisfactions: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 88*(4), 741–749.

Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. *Psychological Bulletin, 125*(6), 627–688.

Diekmann, K. A., Sillito-Walker, S. D., Galinsky, A. D., & Tenbrunsel, A. E. (2013). Double-victimization in the workplace: Why observers condemn passive victims of sexual harassment. *Organization Science*, *24*, 614–628.

Dishman, L. (2014, October 14). The perfect case against Microsoft CEO's remark that women shouldn't ask for raises. *Fast Company*. Retrieved from http://www.fastcompany.com/3037056/strong-female-lead/the-overlooked-leadership-lessons-in-the-microsoft-ceos-conference-fumble

Ditto, P. H., & Lopez, D. F. (1992). Motivated skepticism: Use of differential criteria for preferred and non-preferred conclusions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63*(4), 568–584.

Duffy, M. K., Scott, K. L., Shaw, J. D., Tepper, B. J., & Aquino, K. (2012). A social context model of envy and social undermining. *Academy of Management Journal, 55*(3), 643–666.

Duffy, M. K., & Shaw, J. D. (2000). The Salieri syndrome: Consequences of envy in groups. *Small Group Research, 31,* 3–23.

Duffy, M. K., Shaw, J. D., & Schaubroeck, J. M. (2008). Envy in organizational life. In R. Smith (Ed.), *Envy: Theory and research* (pp. 167–189). Oxford, UK: Oxford Press.

Ellis, A. P. J., Hollenbeck, J. R., Ilgen, D. R., Porter, C. O. L. H., West, B. J., & Moon, H. (2003). Team learning: Collectively connecting the dots. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *88*(5), 821–835.

Elsbach, K. D., & Barr, P. S. (1999). The effects of mood on individuals' use of structured decision protocols. *Organization Science, 10*, 181–198.

Erez, M., & Kanfer, F. H. (1983). The role of goal acceptance in goal setting and task performance. *Academy of Management Review, 8*(3)*,* 454–463.

Eyal, T., Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2008). Judging near and distant virtue and vice. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44*, 1204–1209.

Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2008). Testing theories of fairness intentions matter. *Games and Economic Behavior, 62*, 287–303.

Falk, A, & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. *Games and Economic Behavior*. *54*(2), 293–315.

Fassina, N. E., Jones, D. A., & Uggerslev, K. L. (2008). Relationship clean-up time: using meta-analysis and path analysis to clarify relationships among job satisfaction, perceived fairness, and citizenship behaviors. *Journal of Management, 34,* 161–188.

Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. *Nature, 425*, 785–791.

Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. *Evolution and Human Behavior, 25*, 63–87.

Fehr, E., Krichsteiger, G., & Reidl, A. (1998). Gift exchange and reciprocity in

competitive experimental markets. *European Economic Review, 42*, 1–34.

Fischer, P., Krueger, J. I., Greitemeyer, T., Vogrincic, C., Kastenmuller, A., Frey, D.,… Kainbacher, M. (2011). The bystander effect: A meta-analytic view on bystander intervention in dangerous and non-dangerous emergencies. *Psychological Bulletin, 137*(4), 517–537.

Fitzgerald, L. F., Swan S., & Fischer K. (1995) Why didn't she just report him? The psychological and legal implications of women's responses to sexual harassment. *Journal of Social Issues, 51*. 117–138.

Folger, R. (2001). Fairness as deonance. In S.W. Gilliland, D. D. Steiner, & D. P. Skarlicki (Eds.), *Research in social issues in management* (pp. 3–31). Charlotte, NC: Information Age.

Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. *Games and Economic Behavior, 6,* 347–369.

Fritz, M. S., & MacKinnon, D. P. (2007). Required sample size to detect the mediated effect. *Psychological Science, 18*(3), 233–239.

Gabriel, S., & Gardner, W. L. (1999). Are there "his" and "hers" types of interdependence? The implications of gender differences in collective versus relational interdependence for affect, behavior, and cognition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77*(3), 642–655.

Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. C. (2003). From power to action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85*(3), 453–466.

Galinsky, A. D., Ku, G., & Wang, C. S. (2005). Perspective-taking and self-other overlap: Fostering social bonds and facilitating social coordination. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 8*(2), 109–124.

Galinsky, A. D., Maddux, W. W., Gilin, D., & White, J. B. (2008). Why it pays to get inside the head of your opponent: The differential effects of perspective taking and empathy in negotiations. *Psychological Science, 19*(4), 378–384.

Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78*, 708–724.

Galinsky, A. D., & Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as anchors: The role of perspective taking and negotiator focus. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81*(4), 657–669.

Gardner, D. G., Van Dyne, L., & Pierce, J. L. (2004). The effects of pay level on

organization-based self-esteem and performance: A field study. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, *77*, 307–322.

Gere, J., McDonald, G., Joel, S., Spielmann, S. S., & Impett, E. A. (2013). The independent contributions of social reward and threat perceptions to romantic commitment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105*(6), 961–977.

Gilbert, D. T. (1998). Ordinary personology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & L. Gardner (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 89–150). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Gilovich, T. (1983). Biased evaluation and persistence in gambling. *Journal of Social and Personal Psychology, 44,* 1110–1126.

Glomb, T. M., Bhave, B. P., Miner, A. G., & Wall, M. (2011). Doing good, feeling good: Examining the role of organizational citizenship behaviors in changing mood. *Personnel Psychology, 64,* 191–223.

Grant, A. M., & Berry, J. W. (2011). The necessity of others is the mother of invention: Intrinsic and prosocial motivations, perspective taking, and creativity. *Academy of Management Journal, 54,* 73–96.

Grant, A. M., & Gino, F. (2010). A little thanks goes a long way: Explaining why gratitude expressions motivate prosocial behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98*(6), 946–955.

Greenbaum, R. L., Mawritz, M. B., Mayer, D. M., & Priesemuth, M. (2013). To act out to withdraw, or to constructively resist? Employees' reactions to supervisor abuse of customers and the moderating role of employee moral identity. *Human Relations, 66*(7), 925–950.

Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. *American Psychologist, 35*, 603–618.

Greenwald, A. G. (1981). Self and memory. In G.H. Bower (Ed.), *The psychology of learning and motivation* (Vol. 15, pp. 201–236). New York, NY: Academic Press.

Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*(6), 1464–1480.

Güth, W., & Tietz, R. (1990). Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, *11*, 417–449.

Hackman, R. J., & Lawler, E. E., III. (1971). Employee reactions to job characteristics. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 55,* 259–286.

Harris, D. D. (2013). Understanding performance Anxiety. *The Healthy Dancer.* Retrieved from http://thehealthydancer.blogspot.com/2013/05/understanding-performance-anxiety.html

Hedges, L. V., & Vevea, J. L. (1998). Fixed- and random- effects models in meta-analysis. *Psychological Methods, 3*(4), 486–504.

Heilman, M. E., & Chen, J. J. (2005). Same behavior, divergent consequences: Reactions to men's and women's altruistic citizenship behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 90*(3), 431–441.

Helin, P. (1989). Mental and psychophysiological tension at professional ballet dancers' performances and rehearsals. *Dance Research Journal, 21*, 12–34.

Hennessey, B. A., & Amabile, T. M. (2010). Creativity. *Annual Review of Psychology, 61*, 569–598.

Hershcovis, M. S., & Barling, J. (2010). Comparing victims attributions and outcomes for workplace aggression and sexual harassment. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 95*(5), 874–888.

Hewstone, M. (1990). The 'ultimate attribution error'? A review on the literature on intergroup causal attribution. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 20*(4), 311–334.

Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A., & Smith, V. L. (1996). On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games. *International Journal of Game Theory, 25*, 289–301.

Holtgraves, T. (2004). Social desirability and self-reports: Testing models of socially desirable responding. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30*(2), 161–172.

Hoobler, J. M., & Brass, D. J. (2006). Abusive supervision and family undermining as displaced aggression. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 91,* 1125–1133.

Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3,* 1–24.

Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1972). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the cause of behavior. In E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), *Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior* (pp. 79–94). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk. *Econometrica*, *47*(2), 263–291.

Kelley, H. H. (1973, February). The process of causal attribution. *American Psychologist*, *78,* 107–128.

Kette, G. (1986). Attributions restore consistency in bargaining with liked/disliked partners. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 16*, 257–277.

Kidder, D. L., & McLean-Parks, J. (2001). The good soldier: Who is (s)he? *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22,* 939–959.

Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., Cooper, C. D., & Ferrin, D. L. (2006). When more blame is better than less: The implications of internal vs. external attributions for the repair of trust after a competence- vs. integrity-based trust violation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99*, 49–65.

Komorita, S. S., Parks, C. D., & Hulbert, L. G. (1992). Reciprocity and the induction of cooperation in social dilemmas. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62*(4), 607–617.

Koning, L., Dijk, E. V., Beest, I. V., & Steinel, W. (2010). An instrumental account of deception and reactions to deceit in bargaining. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, *20*(1), 57–73.

Koole, S. L., Jager, W., van den Berg, A. E., Vlek, C. A. J., & Hofstee, W. K. B., (2001). On the social nature of personality: Effects of extraversion, agreeableness, and feedback about collective resource use on cooperation in a resource dilemma. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27*(3), 289–301.

Kopelman, S., Rosette, A. S., & Thompson, L. (2006). The three faces of Eve: Strategic displays of positive, negative, and neutral emotions in negotiations. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99*, 81–101.

Kopelman, S., Weber, J. M., & Messick, D. M. (2002). Factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas: A review of experimental psychological research. In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich, & E. U. Weber (Eds.), *The drama of the commons* (pp. 113–156). Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Kortenkamp, K. V., & Moore, C. F. (2006). Time, uncertainty, and individual differences in decisions to cooperate in resource dilemmas. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32*(5), 603–615.

Kramer, R. M., & Lewicki, R. J. (2010). Repairing and enhancing trust: Approaches to reducing organizational trust deficits. *Academy of Management Annals, 4*, 245–277.

Kühberger, A., Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., & Perner, J. (2002). Framing decisions:

Hypothetical and real. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89*, 1162–1175.

Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin, 108*(3), 480–498.

Kwan, V. S. Y, Bond, M. H., & Singelis, T. M. (1997). Pan cultural explanations for life satisfactions: Adding relationship harmony to self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73*(5), 1038–1051.

Lakey, B., & Cassady, P. B. (1990). Cognitive processes in perceived social support. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59*(2), 337–343.

Landau, E. (2013, May 10). Psychology plus ballet: Meet 'Dr. Dancer'. *CNN*. Retrieved from: http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/10/health/lifeswork-nadine-kaslow/

LePine, J. A., Podsakoff, N. P. & LePine, M. A. (2005). A meta-analytic test of the challenge stressor-Hindrance stressor framework: An explanation for the inconsistent relationships among stressors and performance. *Academy of Management Journal, 48*(5), 764–775.

Lerner, M. J. (1980). *The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion*. New York: Plenum.

Lerner, M. J., & Simmons, C. H. (1966). Observers reaction to the "innocent victim": Compassion or rejection? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4*(2), 203–210.

Lewicki, R., & Bunker, B. (1996). Developing and maintaining trust in work relationships. In R. Kramer & T. Tyler (Eds.), *Trust in organizations* (pp. 114–139). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Libby, L. K., & Eibach, R. P. (2002). Looking back in time: Self-concept change affects visual perspective in autobiographical memory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*(2), 167–179.

Liberman, V., Samuels, S. M., & Ross, L. (2004). The name of the game: Predictive power of reputations versus situational labels in determining prisoner's dilemma game moves. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30*(9), 1175–1185.

Liston, M., Frost, A. A. M., & Mohr, P. B. (2003). The prediction of musical performance anxiety. *Medical Problems of Performing Artists, 18*(3), 120–125.

Loewenstein, G., & Frederick, S. (1997). Predicting reactions to environmental change. In M. Bazerman, D. Messick, A. Tenbrunsel, & K. Wade-Benzoni (Eds.), *Environment, ethics, and behavior* (pp. 52–72). San Francisco: New Lexington

Press.

Luke, D. A. (2004) *Multilevel Modeling.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Maas, C. J. M., & Hox, J. J. (2005). Sufficient sample sizes for multilevel modeling. *Methodology: European Journal of Research Methods for the Behavioral & Social Sciences, 1*(3), 85–91.

MacKinnon, D. P., Krull, J. L. & Lockwood, C. M. (2000). Equivalence of the mediation, confounding and suppressing effect. *Prevention Science, 1*, 173–181.

March, J. G., (1995). *A primer on decision making*. New York: Free Press.

Marks, I. M., & Nesse, R. M. (1994). Fear and fitness: An evolutionary analysis of anxiety disorders. *Ethology and Sociobiology, 15*, 247–261.

Martens, R., & Landers, D. M. (1970). Motor performance under stress: A test of the inverted-U hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16*, 21–37.

Mawritz, M. B., Mayer, D. M., Hoobler, J. M., Wayne, S. J., & Marinova, S. V. (2012). A trickle-down model of abusive supervision. *Personnel Psychology, 65*, 325–357.

Meindl, J. R. (1991). On leadership: An alternative to the conventional wisdom. *Research in Organizational Behavior, 12*, 159–203.

Meindl, J. F., & Ehrlich, S. B. (1987). The romance of leadership and the evaluation of organizational performance. *Academy of Management Journal, 30,* 91–109.

Messick, D. M. (1999). Alternative logics for decision making in social settings. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39*(1), 11–30.

Miller, D. T. (1999). The norm of self-interest. *American Psychologist, 54*(12), 1053–1060.

Moreland, R. L., & Sweeney, P. D. (1984). Self-expectancies and reactions to evaluations of personal performance. *Journal of Personality, 52,* 156–176.

Morrison, E. W., & Phelps, C. C. (1999). Taking charge at work: Extrarole efforts to initiate workplace change. *Academy of Management Journal*, *42,* 403–419.

Murphy, M. C., & Dweck, C. S. (2010). A culture of genius: How an organization's lay theory shapes people's cognition, affect, and behavior. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36*(3), 283–296.

Nelissen, R. M. A., & Zeelenberg, M. (2009). Moral emotions as determinants of third-party punishment: Anger, guilt, and the function of altruistic sanctions. *Judgment*

and Decision Making, 4(7), 543–553.

Neuman, J. H., & Baron, R. A. (1998). Workplace violence and workplace aggression: Evidence concerning specific forms, potential causes, and preferred targets. *Journal of Management, 24*(3), 391–419.

Nussbaum, A. D., & Dweck, C. S. (2008). Defensiveness versus remediation: Self-theories and modes of self-esteem maintenance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34*(5), 599–612.

Nussbaum, S., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Creeping dispositionism: The temporal dynamics of behavior prediction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84*(3), 485–497.

O'Connor, K. M., Arnold, J. A., & Burris, E. R. (2005). Negotiators' bargaining histories and their effects on future negotiation performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 90*(2), 350–362.

O'Reilly, J., & Aquino, K. (2011). A model of third parties' morally motivated responses to mistreatment in organizations. *Academy of Management Review, 36*(3), 526–543.

Okhuysen, G. A., & Bechky, B. A. (2009). Coordination: An integrative perspective. *Academy of Management Annals, 3,* 463–502.

Page, M. P. A., & Norris, D. (1998). The primacy model: A new model of immediate serial recall. *Psychological Review, 105*(4)*,* 761–781.

Parker, S. K., & Axtell, C. M. (2001). Seeing another viewpoint: Antecedents and outcomes of employee perspective taking. *Academy of Management Journal, 44*(6), 1085–1100.

Pillutla, M. M., & Chen, X. (1999). Social norms and cooperation in social dilemmas. The effects of context and feedback. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 78*(2), 81–103.

Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979). Issue involvement can increase or decrease persuasion by enhancing message-relevant cognitive responses. *Journal of personality and Social Psychology, 37*(10), 1915–1926.

Petty, R. E., Haugtvedt, C. P., & Smith, S. M. (1995). Elaboration as a determinant of attitude strength: Creating attitudes that are persistent, resistant, and predictive of behavior. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), *Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences* (pp. 93–130). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Podsakoff, N. P., Whiting, P. W., Podsakoff, P. M., & Blume, B. D. (2009). Individual and organizational level consequences of organizational citizenship behaviors: A

meta-analysis. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 94*, 122–141.

Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Moorman, R. H., & Fetter, R. (1990). Transformational leader behaviors and their effects on followers' trust in leader, satisfaction, and organizational citizenship behaviors. *Leadership Quarterly*, *1,* 107–142.

Posdakoff, P. M., & Organ, D. W. (1986). Self-reports in organizational research: Problems and prospects. *Journal of Management, 12*(4), 531–544.

Postmes, T., Spears, R., Cihangir, S. (2001). Quality of decision making and group norms. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80*(6), 918–930.

Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. *Behavior Research Methods, 40,* 879–891.

Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2009). SPSS Sobel Macro Syntax qjReference [Computer software]. Retrieved from http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes/sobel.htm

Pronin, E., & Ross, L. (2006). Temporal differences in trait self ascription: When the self is seen as an other. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90*(2)*,* 197–209.

Pyszczynski, T., Hamilton, J. C., Herring, F. H., & Greenberg, J. (1989). Depression, self-focused attention, and the negative memory bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57*(2), 351–357.

Regan, D. T., & Totten, J. (1975). Empathy and attribution: Turning observers into actors. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32*(5), 850–856.

Reynolds, R. A. (1997). A validation test of a message elaboration measure. *Communication Research Reports, 14*(3), 269–278.

Riketta, M. (2008). The causal relation between job attitudes and performance: A meta-analysis of panel studies. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 93*, 472–481.

Rocklage, M. D., & Fazio, R. H. (2014). Individual differences in valence weighting: When, how, and why they matter. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *50*, 144–157.

Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. E. (1991). *The person and the situation: Perspectives of social psychology*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Ross, L., Lepper, M. R., & Hubbard, M. (1975). Perseverance in self-perception and

social-perception: Biased attritional processes in the debriefing paradigm. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32*(5), 880–892.

Rotella, K. N., Richeson, J. A., Chiao, J. Y., & Bean, M. G. (2013). The effect of perceived group victimhood on intergroup trust. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39*(1), 115–127.

Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, negativity dominance, and contagion. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5*(4), 296–320.

Rutte, C. G., & Messick, D. M. (1995). An integrated model of perceived unfairness in organizations. *Social Justice Research, 8*(3)*,* 239–261.

Sanfey, A. G. (2007). Social decision-making: Insights from game theory and neuroscience. *Science, 318*, 598–602.

Saucier, G. (1994). Mini-markers: A brief version of Goldberg's unipolar Big-Five markers. *Journal of Personality Assessment, 63,* 506–516.

Schaubroeck, J., & Lam, S. S. K. (2004). Comparing lots before and after: Promotion rejectees invidious reactions to promotees. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 94,* 33–47.

Scherbaum, C. A., & Ferreter, J. M. (2009). Estimating statistical power and required sample sizes for organizational research using multilevel modeling. *Organizational Research Methods, 12*(2), 347–367.

Schlenker, B. R. (1980). *Impression management: The self-concept, social identity, and interpersonal relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/ Cole.

Schlenker, B. R., Pontari, B. A., & Christopher, A. N. (2001). Excuses and character: Personal and social implications of excuses. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *5*(1), 15–32.

Schmidt, A. M., & DeShon, R. P. (2007). What to do? The effects of discrepancies, incentives, and time on dynamic goal prioritization. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 92*(4), 928–941.

Schroth, H., & Shah, P. (2000). Procedures, do we really want to know them? *Journal of Applied Psychology, 85*(3), 462–471.

Schweitzer, M. E., Hershey, J. C., & Bradlow, E. T. (2006). Promises and lies: Restoring violated trust. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 101*, 1–19.

Seta, J. J., Crisson, J. E., Seta, C. E., & Wang, M. A. (1989). Task performance and

perceptions of anxiety: Averaging and summation in an evaluative setting. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56*(3), 387–396.

Settoon, R. P., Bennett, N., & Liden, R. C. (1996). Social exchange in organizations: Perceived organizational support, leader-member exchange, and employee reciprocity. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 81*(3), 219–227.

Shakade, D. A., & Kahneman, D. (1998). Does living in California make people happy? A focusing illusion in judgments of life satisfaction. *Psychological Science, 9*(5), 340–346.

Shapiro, D. L. (1991). The effects of explanations on negative reactions to deceit. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 36,* 614–630.

Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: New procedures and recommendations. *Psychological Methods*, *7,* 422–445.

Skarlicki, D. P., & Folger, R. (1997). Retaliation in the workplace: Roles of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*(3), 434–443.

Skitka, L. J. (2002). Do the means always justify the ends or do the ends sometimes justify the means? A value protection model of justice. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28*(5)*,* 452–461.

Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Sargis, E. G. (2005). Moral conviction: Another contributor to attitude strength or something more? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88*(6), 895–917.

Smirles, K. E. (2004). Attributions of responsibility in cases of sexual harassment: The person and the situation. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34*(2), 342 – 365.

Smith, K. G., Carroll, S. J., & Ashford, S. J. (1995). Intra- and interorganizational cooperation: Toward a research agenda. *Academy of Management Journal, 38*, 7–23.

Smith, R. H., & Kim, S. H. (2007). Comprehending envy. *Psychological Bulletin***,** *133*, 46–64.

Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1997). *Unto others—The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sommer, K. L., & Baumeister, R. F. (2002). Self-evaluation, persistence, and performance following implicit rejection: The role of trait self- esteem. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28*(7)*,* 926–938.

Spencer, S., & Rupp, D. E. (2009). Angry, guilty, and conflicted: Injustice toward coworkers heightens emotional labor through cognitive and emotional mechanisms. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 94*(2), 429–444.

Spreitzer, G. M. (1995). Psychological empowerment in the workplace: Dimensions, measurement, and validation. *Academy of Management Journal, 38*(5), 1442–1465.

Sprouse, J. (2011). A validation of Amazon Mechanical Turk for the collection of acceptability judgments in linguistic theory. *Behavior Research Methods, 43*, 155–167.

Storms, M. D. (1973). Videotape and the attribution process: Reversing actors' and observers' point of view. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27*(2), 165–175.

Straub, P. G., & Murninghan, J. K. (1995). An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: Information, fairness expectations and lowest acceptable offers. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27*, 345–364.

Swann, W. B., & Bosson, J. K. (2010). Self and identity. In S. E. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert & G. Lindzey (Eds). *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 589–628). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Tamir, M. (2005). Don't worry be happy? Neuroticism, trait-consistent affect regulation, and performance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89*(3), 449–461.

Taylor, J. (1987). The performing attitude. *Dance Teacher Now*. Retrieved from http://www.drjimtaylor.com/3.0/writing/articles-2/popular-articles-2/dance/

Taylor, S. E. (1983). Adjustment to threatening events: A theory of cognitive adaptation. *American Psychologist, 38,* 1161–1173.

Taylor, S. E. (1991). Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events: The mobilization-minimization hypothesis. *Psychological Bulletin*, *110*(1), 67–85.

Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. *Psychological Bulletin, 103*(2)*,* 193–210.

Taylor, S. E., Lichtman, R. R., & Wood, J. V. (1984). Attributions, beliefs about control, and adjustment to breast cancer. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46,* 489–502.

Tepper, B. J., Carr, J. C., Breaux, D. M., Geider, S., Hu, C., & Hua, W. (2009). Abusive supervision, intentions to quit, and employees' workplace deviance: A power/dependence analysis. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 109*, 156–167.

Thompson, L., & Deharpport, T. (1998). Relationships, goal incompatibility, and communal orientation in negotiations. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 20*, 33–44.

Thompson, L. L., Wang, J., & Gunia, B. C. (2010). Negotiation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *61*, 491–515.

Tomlinson, E., Dineen, B., & Lewicki, R. (2004). The road to reconciliation: Antecedents of victim willingness to reconcile following a broken promise. *Journal of Management, 31,* 165–187.

Trafimow, D., Bromgard, I. K., Finlay, K. A., & Ketelaar, T. (2005). The role of affect in determining the attributional weight of immoral behaviors. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31*, 935–948.

Trope, Y., & Ben-Yair, E. (1982). Task construction and persistence as means for the self-assessment of abilities. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42*(4), 637–645.

Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance. *Psychological Review, 117*(2), 440–463.

Trötschel, R., Hüffmeier, J., Loschelder, D., Schwartz, K., & Gollwitzer, P. (2011). Perspective taking as a means to overcome motivational barriers in negotiations: When putting oneself into the opponent's shoes helps to walk toward agreements. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101,* 771–790.

Turillo, C. J., Folger, R., Lavelle, J. J., Umphress, E. E., & Gee, J. O. (2002). Is virtue its own reward? Self-sacrificial decisions for the sake of fairness. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89*, 839–865.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science, 185*, 1124–1131.

Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2002). Self-esteem and socioeconomic status: A meta-analytic review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6,* 59–71.

Ubel, P. A., Loewenstein, G., & Jepson, C. (2005). Disability and sunshine: Can hedonic predictions be improved by drawing attention to focusing illusions or emotional adaption? *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 11*(2), 111–123.

Uhl-Bien, M., Graen, G. B., & Scandura, T. (2000). Implications of Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) for strategic human resource management systems: Relationships as social capital for competitive advantage. In G. Ferris (Ed.), *Research in personnel and human resource management* (vol. 18, pp. 137–185).

Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Van den Bos, K., Bruins, J., Wilke, H. A. M., & Dronkert, E. (1999). Sometimes unfair procedures have nice aspects: On the psychology of the fair process effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77*(2), 324–336.

Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77*(2), 337–349.

Van Lange, P. A. M., & Semin-Goossens, A. (1998). The boundaries of reciprocal cooperation. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 28*, 847–854.

Varella, P., Javidan, M., & Waldman, D. A. (2012). A model of instrumental networks: The roles of socialized charismatic leadership and group behavior. *Organization Science, 23*(2), 582–595.

Vazire, S. (2010). Who knows what about a person? The self-other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98*(2), 281–300.

Vecchio, R. P. (2000). Employee jealousy and envy. *International Journal of Stress Management, 7,* 161–179.

Walker, I. J., & Nordin-Bates, S. M. (2010). Performance anxiety experience of professional ballet dancers: The importance of control. *Journal of Dance Medicine and Science, 14*(4), 133–145.

Wang, C. S., Galinsky, A. D., & Murninghan, J. K. (2009). Bad drives psychological reactions, but good propels behavior: Responses to honesty and deception. *Psychological Science, 20*, 634–644.

Wang, C. S., Ku, G., Tai, K., & Galinsky, A. D. (2013). Stupid doctors and smart construction workers: Perspective-taking reduces stereotyping of both negative and positive targets. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *5*(4), 430–436.

Weiner, B. (1985). "Spontaneous" causal thinking. *Psychological Bulletin, 97*(1), 74–84.

Williams, K. D. (2007). Ostracism. *Annual Review of Psychology, 58*, 425–452.

Williams, K. D., Shore, W. J., & Grahe, J. E. (1998). The silent treatment: Perceptions of its behaviors and associated feelings. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 1*, 117–141.

Wingfield, N. (2014, October 9). Microsoft's Nadella sets off a furor on women's pay.

New York Times. Retrieved from http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/microsofts-nadella-backtracks-from-comment-about-women/?_r=0

Wood, J. V., Taylor, S. E., & Lichtman, R. R. (1985). Social comparison in adjustment to breast cancer. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49,* 1169–1183.

Wrzesniewski, A., & Dutton, J. E. (2001). Crafting a job: Revisioning employees as active crafters of their work. *Academy of Management Review, 26*(2), 179–201.

Yaffe, T., & Kark, R. (2011). Leading by example: The case of leader OCB. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 96*(4), 806–826.